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STEALTH GOVERNANCE:
SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS AND PRIVATE
ORDERING
JILL E. FISCH*
ABSTRACT
Corporate law has embraced private ordering—tailoring a firm’s
corporate governance to meet its individual needs. Firms are increasingly
adopting firm-specific governance through dual-class voting structures,
forum selection provisions, and tailored limitations on the duty of loyalty.
Courts have accepted these provisions as consistent with the contractual
theory of the firm, and statutes, in many cases, explicitly endorse their use.
Commentators too support private ordering for its capacity to facilitate
innovation and enhance efficiency.
Private ordering typically occurs through firm-specific charter and
bylaw provisions. VC-funded startups, however, frequently use an
alternative tool—shareholder agreements. These agreements, which have
largely escaped both judicial and academic scrutiny, highlight the extent to
which rights and responsibilities in the corporation should be the subject of
private contract.
This Article offers the first broad-based analysis of shareholder
agreements, detailing the scope of issues to which they are addressed and
identifying the challenges that they pose for corporate governance.
Focusing on the use of shareholder agreements by VC-funded startups, the
Article recognizes the broad role played by shareholder agreements in
structuring and coordinating investors’ economic rights, but it argues that
using shareholder agreements for corporate governance, what this Article
terms “stealth governance,” sacrifices critical corporate law values
including standardization, transparency, and accountability. These
concerns are particularly problematic for the growing number of unicorns
that have substantial economic impact but whose governance structures are
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Section Annual Meeting. Kevin Hayne, Penn Law Class of 2021, provided exemplary research
assistance.
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shielded from the transparency and price discipline of the public capital
markets.
This Article argues that stealth governance is inappropriate for
corporations and instead advocates a uniform structural approach to
corporate law that would limit private ordering to the charter and bylaws.
It further critiques the use of shareholder agreements to evade statutory
limits on charter and bylaw provisions, arguing that, to the extent existing
limits are undesirable, they should be the subject of legislative reform.
A prior draft of this Article was posted with the working title of “Private
Ordering and the Role of Shareholder Agreements.”
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INTRODUCTION
Startups1 are used to breaking things.2 Among the things they break are
traditional corporate governance norms. Dual class stock is one high-profile
example. Google went public in 2004 with dual-class stock,3 shattering the
norm of one share/one vote, and a host of other startups followed its
example.4 Snap went public in 2017 and broke the norm that publicly traded
shares possess at least some voting rights.5
The tools used by startups to engage in private ordering offer a less
visible example.6 The allocation of rights and power in the corporation is
subject to a variety of statutory default rules, but corporations can and do
modify those rules through firm-specific charter and bylaw provisions. This
1.
This Article uses the term startup to describe the growing category of innovative venturefunded companies that defy the traditional categories of public and private companies. For a more
detailed definition and an explanation of why startups warrant distinctive treatment from a governance
perspective, see Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 163–64 (2019).
2.
See THE QUANTIFIED VC, Move Fast and Break Things is Not Dead, MEDIUM (Sept. 14,
2018), https://medium.com/swlh/move-fast-and-break-things-is-not-dead-8260b0718d90 (“‘Moving
fast and breaking things’ is at the heart of the startup philosophy of being scrappy.”).
3.
Google
Inc.,
Prospectus,
at
1
(Aug.
18,
2004),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504143377/d424b4.htm.
4.
See Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Problem of Sunsets, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1057,
1067 (2019) (“Google opened the floodgates, and thereafter, dual class stock has become a norm for
technology companies.”).
5.
See Ken Bertsch, Council of Institutional Invs., Snap and the Rise of No-Vote Common
Shares, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 26, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/26/snap-and-the-rise-of-no-vote-common-shares/
[https://perma.cc/P6Q4-QKTJ] (“With NYSE-listed Snap’s arrival with ‘zero’ rights for public
shareholders, perhaps the bottom has been reached.”).
6.
See Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of Litigation Bylaws, 81 BROOK.
L. REV. 1637, 1638 (2016) (defining private ordering as “the adoption of issuer-specific rules that are
contractual in nature (as opposed to statutes, agency rules, or decisional law)”).
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tailoring is known as private ordering, and common examples include forum
selection provisions, proxy access bylaws, and indemnification provisions.7
Where startups depart from this governance norm is their use of shareholder
agreements rather than the charter and bylaws as a governance tool.8
Although startups widely use investor contracts to navigate financing issues,
adopting structures designed to control risk and mitigate moral hazard,9 the
scope of these contracts has expanded to governance issues such as
inspection rights, appraisal rights, and fiduciary duties, as well as the
allocation of control and the composition of the board of directors. The use
of shareholder agreements—rather than charter and bylaw provisions—as
governance tools raises a variety of issues but has largely escaped
attention.10
This Article addresses that oversight and argues that the use of
shareholder agreements as governance tools, what this Article terms “stealth
governance,” is troubling. Using shareholder agreements for corporate
governance instead of the charter and bylaws sacrifices important corporate
law values including transparency, predictability, and standardization.
Shareholder agreements facilitate unequal treatment of shareholders and
pose a particular risk when they are used to limit the rights of minority
shareholders in private companies.
Perhaps most problematically, corporations appear to be using
shareholder agreements, at least in part, to avoid mandatory elements of
corporate law that would constrain analogous charter or bylaw provisions.

7.
Private ordering is not limited to startups. Corporate law affords firms extensive flexibility
to modify statutory default rules with respect to the structure of the corporation, the rights of
shareholders, and the scope of director liability. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract:
The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 373, 379 (2018) (describing the scope of
private ordering permitted by corporate law); Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Interpreting Organizational
“Contracts” and the Private Ordering of Public Company Governance, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 985,
988 (2019) (“With increasing frequency and creativity, the certificate of incorporation and bylaws of
public corporations are being used as tools for restructuring key aspects of corporate governance.”).
8.
The term “shareholder agreement” encompasses several types of contracts by and among
shareholders including voting agreements, stock purchase agreements, and investors’ rights agreements.
See NVCA, Model Legal Documents (Sept. 2, 2021), https://nvca.org/model-legal-documents/
[https://perma.cc/VDZ2-4EHW]. This Article will refer to these documents collectively as shareholder
agreements.
9.
See, e.g., Susheng Wang & Hailan Zhou, Staged Financing in Venture Capital: Moral
Hazard and Risks, 10 J. CORP. FIN. 131 (2004) (modeling how staged financing can control agency
problems); Manuel A. Utset, High-Powered (Mis)Incentives and Venture-Capital Contracts, 7 OHIO ST.
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 45 (2012) (exploring how venture capital financing contracts address
entrepreneurial opportunism).
10.
As of the date of this Article, only one other article has broadly considered the role of
shareholder agreements in corporate governance. See Gabriel Rauterberg, The Separation of Voting and
Control: The Role of Contract in Corporate Governance, 38 YALE J. REGUL. 1124 (2021) (analyzing
the use of shareholder agreements to allocate control rights contractually).
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Two recent decisions are illustrative. In Manti Holdings LLC v. Authentix
Acquisition Co.,11 the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a provision in a
shareholder agreement waiving the appraisal rights of common
stockholders. And in Juul Labs, Inc. v. Grove, the Delaware chancery court
considered but did not resolve the validity of a provision purporting to waive
shareholders’ statutory inspection rights.12 Notably, despite questions about
their validity,13 the use of both provisions appears to be common.14
These concerns are heightened by the context in which shareholder
agreements are used—venture-backed startup companies for which
problematic governance practices are already a growing concern.15 Because
shareholder agreements are largely, albeit not exclusively, a private
company phenomenon,16 their legal analysis has drawn from principles of
contract law rather than corporate law, an approach that is consistent with
the nature of the traditional close corporation but that makes little sense for
today’s technology startups. In addition, their use creates an anomalous

11.
Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., C.A. No. 354, 2020, 2021 Del. LEXIS
286 (Del. Sept. 13, 2021).
12.
Juul Labs, Inc. v. Grove, 238 A.3d 904, 919 (Del. Ch. 2020).
13.
See id. at 919–20 (summarizing arguments for and against the validity of inspection rights
waivers).
14.
Both appraisal waivers and inspection rights waivers are part of the most recent versions of
the National Venture Capital Association’s model documents. See NVCA, Voting Agreement (updated
July 2020), at 7, https://nvca.org/recommends/nvca-2020-voting-agreement-2/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2021)
(including waiver of appraisal rights and the right to bring fiduciary duty litigation); NVCA, Investors’
Rights Agreement (updated Sept. 2020), at 24–25, https://nvca.org/recommends/nvca-2020-investorsrights-agreement-2/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2021) (waiver of statutory inspection rights). For an explanation
of the model documents and the process by which they are developed, see Dror Futter, NVCA Updates
Its Series A Model Legal Documents, VC EXPERTS: BLOG (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://blog.vcexperts.com/2018/09/18/nvca-updates-its-series-a-model-legal-documents/
[https://perma.cc/LC26-YZPC]. See also Roy Shapira, Corporate Law, Retooled: How Books and
Records Revamped Judicial Oversight, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. 101, 151 (2021) (describing efforts by
startup companies to limit employee use of inspection rights through shareholder agreements); Anat
Alon-Beck, Bargaining Inequality: Employee Golden Handcuffs and Asymmetric Information (June 6,
2021)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://www.lawfin.unifrankfurt.de/fileadmin/user_upload/ABeck_Bargaining_Inequality_-_6.6.2021_.pdf (reporting that
startup companies increasingly require employees to waive inspection rights in order to receive stock
options).
15.
See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165,
167–168 (2017) (observing that “in the absence of an impending IPO, Unicorn managers and investors
lack sufficient incentives to develop governance structures and practices appropriate for enterprises of
their scale”); Amy Deen Westbrook, What to Do About Poor Corporate Governance at Unicorns, CLS
BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 18, 2021), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2021/01/18/what-to-do-aboutpoor-corporate-governance-at-unicorns/ [https://perma.cc/H5RK-YFA4] (“Uber, Theranos, Zenefits,
and a host of other companies struggled with bad governance while unicorns.”).
16.
See Rauterberg, supra note 10 (detailing frequency with which shareholder agreements
continue in effect after an issuer’s initial public offering).
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dichotomy in the scope of corporate law in an era in which the line between
public and private corporations has become increasingly blurred.17
This Article argues that contract based private ordering is inappropriate
for corporations and instead advocates a uniform structural approach to
corporate law. Corporate law provides a set of substantive and procedural
rules that define the corporation and govern the rights and powers of its
constituencies. The use of the corporate form signals the application of these
rules both to corporate participants such as officers, directors, and
shareholders and to third parties that deal with the corporation. These rules
provide predictability with respect to the corporation’s operations, enhance
the accuracy of investment pricing, and facilitate the use of contracts.
Within these rules, a corporation’s charter and bylaws are key. Together
they form the corporation’s governing documents; they set out the rights and
responsibilities of officers, directors, and shareholders. Corporate law
incorporates the concept of implicit consent—the terms of the governing
documents are binding on all corporate participants, regardless of their
individual sophistication, knowledge, and consent. Corporate law provides
the procedures by which these documents may be altered and the features
they can contain. Moving from the implicit contract of corporate law to the
explicit contract of common law sacrifices fundamental values of the
corporate form.
As a result, the Article argues that corporations should engage in private
ordering exclusively through their charter and bylaws, and that courts
should invalidate shareholder agreements that attempt to substitute for the
corporation’s constitutive documents.18 Critically, it maintains that
shareholder agreements should not be used to restructure the scope of
officer, director, and controlling shareholder accountability. In addition, the
Article argues that shareholder agreements should be subject to the
traditional hierarchy of governance tools, meaning that a shareholder

17.
See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 384 (2013) (explaining that the “boundary
issues along the public-private divide are under theorized and, up until recently, left to resolution by
reference to regulatory legacies from a time far different from today’s trading markets”).
18.
This Article focuses specifically on the use of shareholder agreements to address corporate
governance issues such as inspection rights, appraisal rights, control rights, and the selection and
removal of directors. It is not addressed to issues such as the number and price of shares being sold and
the future capital commitments by investors. See, e.g., NVCA, Stock Purchase Agreement (updated Sept.
2020), at 1, https://nvca.org/recommends/nvca-2020-stock-purchase-agreement-2/ (last visited Oct. 2,
2021) (indicating that the model agreement does not include characteristics of the shares sold or the
rights of the parties post-closing in recognition of the fact that these issues are typically addressed in the
charter and may implicate the rights of third parties).
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agreement that is inconsistent with the statute, charter, or bylaws should not
be enforceable.19
This approach would have the effect of limiting certain innovations in
private ordering—specifically it would invalidate corporate efforts to
impose waivers of appraisal rights, inspection rights, and fiduciary duties,
as well as certain allocations of shareholder control, through shareholder
agreements. The Article argues that the case for the permissible scope of
private ordering is context specific and should not depend on whether the
instrument used is a shareholder agreement or a charter provision but on the
policy implications of allowing firm-specific variation with respect to a
particular legal rule or shareholder right. To the extent that private ordering
is normatively desirable, the appropriate solution is explicit legislation
authorizing variation in the charter or bylaws, an approach that the Delaware
legislature has consistently taken in response to evolving business needs.20
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the role of private
ordering in corporate governance and identifies the limits corporate law
imposes on such private ordering through mandatory rules. Part II describes
stealth governance—the development of shareholder agreements as a
governance tool. Part III identifies concerns over the use of shareholder
agreements for private ordering as an alternative to charter and bylaw
provisions. Part IV concludes that, based on these concerns, private ordering
should take place through the charter and bylaws and existing limitations on
the availability of such tools should be the subject of legislative reform.
I. PRIVATE ORDERING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. The Role of Private Ordering
Private ordering—tailoring a corporation’s structure and governance
mechanisms to meet firm-specific needs—is an important feature of
corporate law. New IPO companies like Facebook and Snap use dual or
multiclass voting structures to protect a founder’s ability to pursue his or
her idiosyncratic vision while enabling public shareholders to share in the

19.
See, e.g., Andrew K. Jennings, Firm Value and Intracorporate Arbitration, 38 REV. LITIG.
1, 11 (2018) (explaining that corporations are governed by a hierarchy of public and private law headed
by “the substantive corporate law of the firm's chartering jurisdiction, followed by the firm’s charter and
then its bylaws”).
20.
For an assessment of the policy considerations relevant to whether the legislature should
explicitly authorize private ordering with respect to shareholder appraisal rights, see Jill E. Fisch, A
Lesson from Startups: Contracting Out of Shareholder Appraisal, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
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economic growth of the firm.21 VC-funded firms like Trados implement
negotiated board structures that balance control rights and veto power
among shareholders with different incentives and skill sets.22 A growing
number of corporations are adopting provisions to increase board
accountability to shareholders such as majority voting23 and proxy access.24
The standard tools by which corporations engage in private ordering are
the certificate of incorporation or charter and the bylaws.25 State corporation
statutes allow corporations to tailor their charter and bylaws to meet their
individual needs. Most statutory provisions are structured as default rules
that explicitly authorize individual corporations to modify the statutory
default through a charter provision, a bylaw, or, in some cases, a board
resolution. For example, section 141 of the Delaware statute provides that,
as a default rule, corporations shall elect the board of directors on an annual
basis.26 The statute explicitly authorizes corporations to depart from this
default and to adopt a staggered board.27 The statute further instructs
corporations that, if they choose to modify the statutory default and engage
in private ordering, they must do so “by the certificate of incorporation or
by an initial bylaw, or by a bylaw adopted by a vote of the stockholders.”28
As section 141 illustrates, in many cases, the statutory text explicitly
contemplates private ordering. The scope of private ordering is not,
however, limited to topics for which there is specific statutory authorization.
State statutes afford corporate participants broad authority to use the charter
and bylaws to adopt firm-specific governance terms. For example, section
21.
See, e.g., Dave Michaels, Facebook, Snap and Other Firms Targeted by SEC Regulator’s
Attack on Dual-Class Shares,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2018, 4:30 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-to-viacom-targeted-by-sec-regulators-attack-on-dual-classshares-1518730229 [https://perma.cc/7ELK-Y74C] (describing Facebook and Snap as using multiclass
voting structures to preserve founder control).
22.
See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 1512-CC, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 128, at *3
(Del. Ch. July 24, 2009) (describing composition of Trados board of directors which included four
representatives of venture capital firms, two Trados executives and one outside director).
23.
See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Does Majority Voting
Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1144 (2016) (empirically analyzing adoption
of majority voting at S&P 1500 companies).
24.
See, e.g., Holly J. Gregory, Rebecca Grapsas & Claire Holland, The Latest on Proxy Access,
HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Feb.
1,
2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/01/the-latest-on-proxy-access/
[https://perma.cc/MU3H9Y6J] (reporting that 71% of S&P 500 companies had adopted a proxy access bylaw by the end of 2018,
up from 1% in 2014).
25.
See, e.g., Shaner, supra note 7, at 988 (“With increasing frequency and creativity, the
certificate of incorporation and bylaws of public corporations are being used as tools for restructuring
key aspects of corporate governance.”).
26.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2021).
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
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102(b)(1) of the Delaware statute allows the charter to contain “[a]ny
provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the
corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, or any class of the
stockholders, . . . if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this
State.”29 Section 109(b) provides that the bylaws may address any subject,
“not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating
to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or
powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or
employees.”30
The courts have upheld the power of corporations to address a variety of
novel issues through bylaw and charter provisions. For example, in
Boilermakers, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the validity of forumselection bylaws.31 In ATP, the court found fee-shifting bylaws to be facially
valid.32 Most recently, in Salzberg, the Delaware Supreme Court made
national headlines33 when it upheld a charter provision requiring certain
federal securities claims to be filed in federal court.34
The rationale for these decisions is the contractual theory of the
corporation.35 As then-Chancellor Strine explained in Boilermakers, “the
bylaws of a Delaware corporation constitute part of a binding broader
contract among the directors, officers, and stockholders formed within the
statutory framework of the [Delaware General Corporation Law].”36
Strine’s reasoning in Boilermakers explains the rationale behind the
contractual approach. As Strine explained, shareholders implicitly consent
to the terms of the charter and bylaws when they make the voluntary
decision to invest in a corporation.37 Moreover, shareholders have the power
29.
§ 102(b)(1). See Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 115 (Del. 2020) (describing section
102(b)(1)’s scope as “broadly enabling”).
30.
§ 109(b).
31.
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013).
32.
ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). Subsequently, the
legislature amended the statute to prohibit fee-shifting charter and bylaw provisions.
33.
Alison Frankel, Dela. Supreme Court: Companies Can Pick Forum for Shareholders’
Section 11 Claims, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2020, 6:08 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otcblueapron/dela-supreme-court-companies-can-pick-forum-for-shareholders-section-11-claimsidUSKBN21540M [https://perma.cc/Q28D-N6U3].
34.
Salzberg, 227 A.3d. at 137.
35.
See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Products & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010) (citing
Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del. 1990)) (describing bylaws as
“contracts among a corporation’s shareholders”).
36.
Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939. The Delaware legislature validated the former when, in 2015,
it adopted legislation expressly authorizing issuers to adopt forum selection provisions in their charters
and bylaws. 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2015).
37.
Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939. Strine further observed that shareholders also consent to the
possibility that the board will unilaterally amend the bylaws when they invest in a corporation in which
the board has been given the authority to do so. Id. at 958.
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to modify contract terms with which they disagree, either by amending the
bylaws or removing and replacing the directors.38 In addition to providing a
justification for upholding charter and bylaw provisions that adopt firmspecific governance terms, the contractual approach also offers a
methodology for interpreting those provisions—they are to be interpreted
using contract principles.39
The contractual approach supports broad flexibility in firm-specific
private ordering. Commentators defend this approach on variety of
efficiency grounds.40 Private ordering allows efficient customization in
corporate structures by enabling rules to vary with firm-specific
differences.41 It allows innovation and experimentation and reduces the risk
of regulatory error associated with mandatory regulation.42 A firm’s
governance choices are also constrained by market discipline.43
Not only do firms engage in extensive private ordering, they continue to
innovate by adopting new governance provisions. One example is forum
selection bylaws, which corporations have adopted in an effort to reduce the
incidence of multi-forum litigation.44 Many corporations have increased
shareholder power over the process of electing directors through the

38.
Id. at 956–57.
39.
See BlackRock Credit Allocation Income Tr. v. Saba Cap. Master Fund, Ltd., 224 A.3d 964,
977 (Del. 2020) (“‘Because corporate charters and bylaws are contracts, our rules of contract
interpretation apply.’” (quoting Hill Int’l, Inc. v. Opportunity Partners L.P., 119 A.3d 30, 38 (Del.
2015))).
40.
See Fisch, supra note 6, at 1639 (describing the advantages of private ordering). Notably, not
all commentators agree with this position. See, e.g., Michal Barzuza, Inefficient Tailoring: The Private
Ordering Paradox in Corporate Law, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 131 (2018) (identifying efficiency costs
associated with allowing firms to engage in private ordering instead of subjecting them to mandatory
rules).
41.
See, e.g., Roberta Romano, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1 (1993) (“The
genius of American corporate law . . . [is that firms] can particularize their charters under a state code,
as well as seek the state whose code best matches their needs so as to minimize their cost of doing
business.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1418 (1989) (“No one set of terms will be best for all; hence the ‘enabling’ structure of corporate
law.”).
42.
See id. (citing bylaws responding to board adoption and use of poison pills as an example of
innovation through private ordering); D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private
Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORD. L. REV. 125, 174 (2011) (explaining that private ordering
enables “each corporation to become a laboratory of corporate governance, experimenting with different
models of shareholder participation and ultimately producing a diversity of governance forms and
practices”).
43.
Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm,
28 J.L. & ECON. 179, 182 (1985) (“Markets lead managers to adopt the optimal mix of legal and market
governance structures for their own firm.”).
44.
Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder
Litigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 32–33 (2017) (documenting the spread of forum-selection
provisions after the Boilermakers decision).

2021]

STEALTH GOVERNANCE

923

adoption of majority voting 45 and proxy access provisions.46 And Gabriel
Rauterberg and Eric Talley report widespread adoption of corporate
opportunity doctrine waivers in response to the Delaware legislature’s 2000
statutory authorization of such waivers in section 122(17).47
B. The Limits of Private Ordering
The contract analogy as a basis for private ordering in corporate law is
imperfect, however.48 Although corporate law provides broad authority for
firm-specific tailoring, certain elements of corporate law are generally
understood to be mandatory and therefore beyond the scope of permissible
private ordering.49 Commentators term these elements “mandatory
corporate law.”50 As Chancellor Allen explained, “[corporate law] is not,
however, bereft of mandatory terms . . . . Generally, these mandatory
provisions may not be varied by the terms of the certificate of incorporation
or otherwise.”51
One limit on private ordering is the statutory text. For example, DGCL
section 102(f) prohibits fee-shifting charter provisions in connection with
internal corporate claims, and section 109(b) does the same for bylaws.52
45.
Choi et al., supra note 23 (analyzing the adoption of firm specific majority voting provisions).
46.
See, e.g., CII RSCH. AND EDUC. FUND, PROXY ACCESS BY PRIVATE ORDERING (2017),
https://www.cii.org/files/publications/misc/02_02_17_proxy_access_private_ordering_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8U7L-Z4QK] (reporting on firms’ adoption of proxy access bylaws through private
ordering).
47.
Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1079 (2017) (stating
that “hundreds of public corporations in our sample—and well over one thousand in the population—
have disclosed or executed waivers”).
48.
See Fisch, supra note 7, at 377 (challenging the contract metaphor because shareholders’
power to adopt and amend bylaws is more limited than that of the board).
49.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay
on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989). Jurisdictions outside the United States rely more
heavily on mandatory corporate law. See, e.g., Jens Dammann, The Mandatory Law Puzzle: Redefining
American Exceptionalism in Corporate Law, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2014) (distinguishing U.S. law,
which is primarily enabling, from European law, which involves more mandatory terms); see also
Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, Innovation in Corporate Law,
31 J. COMP. ECON. 676, 689 (2003) (comparing the corporate law of ten jurisdictions and describing
Delaware as an “outlier[] . . . on the flexible end of the spectrum”).
50.
See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW.
U. L. REV. 542, 543 (1990) (using term “mandatory corporate law” to refer to corporate law rules that
are not “waivable by contract among the relevant parties”).
51.
In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred Stock, 698 A.2d 973, 976 (Del. Ch. 1997)
(emphasis added).
52.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(f) (2021) (“The certificate of incorporation may not contain
any provision that would impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the
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Similarly, section 102(b)(7) authorizes contractual limitations on the scope
of director fiduciary duties but does not permit a waiver of the duty of
loyalty or the obligation to adhere to the statutory limits on the payment of
dividends.53
The second limit is implicit. The language of statutes that authorize firmspecific charter and bylaw provisions forbid such provisions that are
“contrary to the laws of this state.”54 As then-Vice Chancellor Strine stated
in Jones Apparel, “contrary to the laws of this State” means charter
provisions that “‘transgress a statutory enactment or a public policy settled
by the common law or implicit in the General Corporation [Law] itself.’”55
Courts have generally interpreted this language to mean that some
provisions in the corporation code are mandatory and cannot be modified
through private ordering.56 Chancellor Allen identified several mandatory
aspects of corporate law in his decision in Ford Holdings:
Under Delaware law, for example, a corporation is required to have
an annual meeting for the election of directors; is required to have
shareholder approval for amendments to the certificate of
incorporation; must have appropriate shareholder concurrence in the
authorization of a merger; and is required to have shareholder
approval in order to dissolve. Generally, these mandatory provisions
may not be varied by terms of the certificate of incorporation or
otherwise.57
The basis by which courts determine which aspects of corporate law are
mandatory is not entirely clear. Courts have been guided in part by the
statutory text. For example, some courts have read a statute as mandatory if
it contains the word “shall.” Thus the court in H-M Wexford held that the
requirements of section 228(c) concerning the validity of written consents
were mandatory because “[t]he word ‘shall’ is a mandatory term.”58
corporation or any other party in connection with an internal corporate claim, as defined in § 115 of this
title.”); § 109(b) (“The bylaws may not contain any provision that would impose liability on a
stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any other party in connection with
an internal corporate claim, as defined in § 115 of this title.”).
53.
See Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., C.A. No. 9477, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 56, at *25 (Del
Ch. May 30, 1989) (denying motion to dismiss a claim alleging that such a charter provision was
invalid).
54.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1).
55.
Jones Apparel Grp. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837, 843 (Del. Ch. 2004) (quoting
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952)).
56.
See id. at 846 (explaining that the court will “invalidate a certificate provision . . . [that]
vitiates or contravenes a mandatory rule of our corporate code”).
57.
In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred Stock, 698 A.2d 973, 976 (Del. Ch. 1997)
(citations omitted).
58.
H-M Wexford LLC v. Encorp, Inc., 832 A.2d 129, 152 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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Similarly, the court in Speiser v. Baker emphasized the language of section
211 which states that a corporation “shall” hold an annual meeting.59
Courts have also looked to the policy behind the statute, reasoning that
the statute sets up certain core components of the rights and responsibilities
of directors and shareholders that are not subject to firm-specific
modification. One of the areas in which courts have applied this reasoning
is with respect to shareholders’ rights to remove directors. Accordingly, the
Rohe court concluded that a corporate charter could not restrict the right of
shareholders to remove directors of a nonclassified board without cause
because the removal right was a “fundamental element of stockholder
authority” that could not be eliminated by the charter.”60 The court in
Frechter v. Zier applied a similar rationale to invalidate a bylaw providing
that shareholder could only remove directors by a two-thirds vote.61
Notably, the court in Frechter explicitly rejected the argument that, in order
to qualify as a mandatory provision, a statute section must contain the words
shall or must.62 It seems likely that courts would take a similar view with
respect to a charter or bylaw that attempted to divest shareholders of their
power to amend the bylaws, although provisions that require such a
supermajority vote to do so have been upheld.63
A similar rationale applies in other areas. The court in Kurz concluded
that directors could not adopt a bylaw that would have the effect of enabling
them to remove a fellow director.64 Although the text of the Delaware statute
does not explicitly define or impose fiduciary duties on corporate officers
and directors, commentators have widely reasoned that public policy
reasons bar charter or bylaw provisions that limit or eliminate the duty of
loyalty.65 Thus, the court in Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures held that the
59.
Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001, 1005 (Del. Ch. 1987).
60.
Rohe v. Reliance Training Network, Inc., C.A. No. 17992, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 108, at *37
(July 21, 2000). See also Oral Argument on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and Rulings of the
Court at 18, In re VAALCO Energy, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 11775, 2015 WL 13631027 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 21, 2015) (reaching the same conclusion).
61.
Frechter v. Zier, C.A. No. 12038, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14, at *5–6 (Jan. 24, 2017) (“Under
the plain language of the statute, I find that the Removal provision is inconsistent with Section 141(k).”).
62.
See id. at *7. But see Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., C.A. No. 9477, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS
56, at *21 (May 30, 1989) (rejecting challenge to charter provision providing the board with the
exclusive authority to fill vacancies on the board and newly-created directorships, based on the
permissive character of § 223).
63.
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000).
64.
Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140, 157 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“For 89 years, Delaware law has
barred directors from removing other directors.”) (citations omitted).
65.
The extent to which corporate law permits the waiver of fiduciary duties has been debated
extensively. See Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 47, at 1077 n.8 (citing commentators arguing that duty
of loyalty is a mandatory component of corporate law). This conclusion has support in the statutory text.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). Accord Neubauer v. Goldfarb, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 218, 225 (Ct.
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Delaware statute barred a charter provision purporting to limit director
liability under the corporate opportunity doctrine.66 In Jones Apparel, the
court recognized that Delaware law affords shareholders and managers
broad power to engage in private ordering through charter provisions but
nonetheless questioned whether a charter provision that divested the board
of its statutory power to approve a merger or amend the charter would be
valid.67
To the extent that mandatory provisions in corporate law are viewed as
undesirable, one potential response is that alternative business forms, such
as the limited partnership and limited liability company, allow greater
contractual freedom.68 In Delaware, the statutes for both these alternative
entity forms explicitly state that they are intended to give the maximum
possible effect to principles of freedom of contract.69 Similarly, Delaware
and other states allow statutory close corporations in which the participants
are explicitly granted greater contractual freedom than in the traditional
corporation.70 Accordingly, business participants that desire greater
contractual freedom than is available under corporate law can choose a
different business form. Indeed, a number have chosen to do so, and courts
have upheld provisions in LLCs and LPs that broadly eliminate managers’
fiduciary duties.71
App. 2003) (holding that “waiver of corporate directors’ and majority shareholders’ fiduciary duties to
minority shareholders in private close corporations is against public policy”). Amir Licht has argued that
transaction costs and information asymmetries provide a justification for precluding fiduciary duties
from being fully contractable and suggests that permitting fiduciary duty waivers would “lead to
suboptimal ‘market for lemons’ equilibrium at the societal level.” Amir N. Licht, Motivation,
Information, Negotiation: Why Fiduciary Accountability Cannot be Negotiable, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 159, 179 (2018). But see Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 47, at 1077
(arguing that the perception that the duty of loyalty is mandatory is no longer true in light of the adoption
by Delaware and other states of statutory provisions permitting corporations to waive the corporate
opportunity doctrine).
66.
Siegman, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 56, at *24–25. The Delaware legislature subsequently
overturned Siegman by statute. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17).
67.
Jones Apparel Grp., Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837, 849 n.30 (Del. Ch. 2004).
68.
But see Leo E. Strine, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual
Freedom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 11 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein eds., 2015) (questioning the value of
unlimited contractual freedom for noncorporate business forms).
69.
See, e.g., tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (“It is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to
the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability agreements It is the
policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the
enforceability of limited liability agreements.”).
70.
See Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of Corporation Law,
5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263, 286, 295 (2008) (explaining why corporate law’s “statutory norms” were a
poor fit for close corporations and describing the body of common and statutory law specific to the close
corporation as a response to this problem).
71.
See Peter Molk, Protecting LLC Owners While Preserving LLC Flexibility, 51 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 2129 (2018).
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II. PRIVATE ORDERING THROUGH SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS
The mandatory features in corporate law limit the scope of private
ordering available through charter and bylaw provisions. As noted in Part I,
the charter and bylaws must be consistent with the governing statute and,
although statutes do not impose many limits on private ordering, courts will
invalidate provisions that transgress those limits. This Part considers an
alternative tool for implementing private ordering—the shareholder
agreement.
Shareholder agreements have their origin in close corporations, small
family businesses that are run, in many cases, as incorporated partnerships.72
Close corporations typically have a small number of shareholders,
substantial shareholder participation in the management of the corporation
and little or no market for the corporation’s stock.73 In close corporations,
shareholder agreements are used to provide predictability and stability, 74
and their use dates back many years.75 Participants in close corporations
frequently use shareholder agreements to designate specific individuals to
serve as directors or officers, to limit the authority of directors, and to
increase shareholder control over operational decisions.76 Close
corporations’ use of shareholder agreements in these ways were in tension
with the statutory authority of the board of directors, a tension that led early
courts to view them with skepticism. 77 As a result, a number of state
legislatures enacted close corporation statutes that explicitly authorized
greater contractual freedom among the participants in corporations that
elected to be governed under their terms.78
72.
George D. Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 435, 435 (1953).
73.
See, e.g., Kaplan v. First Hartford Corp., 484 F. Supp. 2d 131, 132 n.2 (D. Maine 2007).
Close corporations are typically defined “by a blending of the roles of shareholder, officer, and director;
the close personal relationships between the players; and the lack of market for reselling shares.” Martin
Edwards, The Big Crowd and the Small Enterprise: Intracorporate Disputes in the Close-ButCrowdfunded Firm, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 411, 414 (2018).
74.
See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 584 (Ill. 1964) (explaining that in a close
corporation, “often the only sound basis for protection is afforded by a lengthy, detailed shareholder
agreement securing the rights and obligations of all concerned”).
75.
See, e.g., Faulds v. Yates, 57 Ill. 416, 420 (1870) (upholding shareholder agreement to choose
the company’s officers and directors).
76.
Wells, supra note 70, at 298.
77.
See, e.g., Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559 (N.Y. 1918) (invalidating shareholder agreement
that violated statutory requirement that corporation be managed by the board of directors); McQuade v.
Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934) (invalidating shareholder agreement that selected corporate
officers and determined their salaries as stripping the board of its power to do so).
78.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (2021) (“A written agreement among the stockholders
of a close corporation holding a majority of the outstanding stock entitled to vote, whether solely among
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VC-funded startups differ substantially from the prototypical close
corporation.79 They have centralized management, hundreds of
shareholders—many of whom are passive investors—and shares that are
frequently traded, albeit not in the public markets.80 Market and regulatory
developments have allowed startups to stay private for an extended period
of time, and many have grown to substantial size.81 The most visible are the
Silicon Valley unicorns, private corporations with a valuation of $1 billion
or more.82 As of September 30, 2021, there were almost unicorns.83
Although they often remain private for many years, VC-funded startups
raise money from a wide range of investors through increasingly complex
capital structures.84 Early-stage investors are predominantly venture capital
funds, but, as a startup grows, its investor base is likely to expand to a
broader range of shareholders, including employees,85 mutual funds, and
pension funds.86 The interests of these investors may differ substantially
from those of the founders and the early-stage investors.87 In addition, earlythemselves or with a party not a stockholder, is not invalid, as between the parties to the agreement, on
the ground that it so relates to the conduct of the business and affairs of the corporation as to restrict or
interfere with the discretion or powers of the board of directors.”).
79.
See Carol Goforth, Too Many Cooks Spoil the Cake, and Too Many Statutes Spoil the LLC:
A Plea for Uniformity, 46 SW. L. REV. 63 (2016) (describing these as companies that have not yet gone
public); Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 159 (2019) (explaining that
venture capital-funded “startups are different from both public corporations and traditional closely held
corporations”).
80.
See, e.g., Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 17, at 349–50 (describing the growth of
platforms that facilitate the trading of private company stock).
81.
See Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public
Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445 (2017) (describing regulatory factors leading to the growth of large
private companies).
82.
Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L.
REV. 583, 584 (2016).
83.
Gené Teare, Crunchbase Unicorn Board Leaps to Just Under 1,000 Companies, Reaches
$3.4T in Value, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (Sept. 30, 2021), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/crunchbaseunicorn-board-1000-companies/ [https://perma.cc/M82N-6C58]. As Fan notes, the growing number of
unicorns has led commentators to coin a new term, the “decacorn,” which refers to a company with a
valuation of $10 billion or more. Fan, supra note 82, at 588.
84.
See Fan, supra note 82 (detailing the structure of five well-known unicorns).
85.
See Yifat Aran, Making Disclosure Work for Start-up Employees, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
867, 880–881 (“[A] growing number of employees have started accepting compensation agreements in
which equity grants represent a significant proportion of their pay.”); Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock
Options—Golden Goose or Trojan Horse? 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 107 (describing historical
practice by startups of compensating their employees largely with stock options).
86.
See, e.g., Michael Ewens & Joan Farre-Mensa, The Deregulation of the Private Equity
Markets and the Decline in IPOs, 33 REV. FIN. STUD. 5463, 5497 (2020) (“[N]on-traditional startup
investors, such as PE, mutual, and hedge funds, have greatly increased their investments in late-stage
startups.”).
87.
See, e.g., Sergey Chernenko, Josh Lerner & Yao Zeng, Mutual Funds as Venture Capitalists?
Evidence from Unicorns, 34 REV. FIN. STUD. 2362 (2021) (identifying agency problems between early
and late-stage investors resulting, in part, by the need by mutual funds to focus on liquidity rights).
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stage investors may sell their shares through privately negotiated
transactions or on developing secondary markets without the discipline and
regulatory scrutiny associated with the public offering process.88
Both the financial condition and the governance structure of startups are
opaque. As commentators have observed, private companies are not subject
to mandatory disclosure requirements limiting the ability of both
shareholders and regulators to exercise oversight.89 Startup valuations are
notoriously unreliable and, in many cases, a startup’s value is revised
sharply downward once its financial statements are subject to the public
disclosure associated with the IPO process.90 Lack of disclosure may hide a
host of governance problems ranging from conflicts of interest to outright
fraud.91 Later stage investors may lack both the bargaining power and the
sophistication necessary to protect themselves from exploitation.92
There are reasons to believe that large private companies systematically
have poor governance practices relative to their publicly traded peers, a
problem Renee Jones terms the “Unicorn Governance Trap.” 93 Hillary Sale
and Donald Langevoort describe technology startups as engaged in
“corporate adolescence” and warn that the absence of adult supervision
through effective governance leads to a variety of problems including
excessive risk-taking and rule-breaking.94 Unicorns also expose both their
investors and the public to significant risk.95

88.
A variety of secondary markets have developed to enable trading in the stock of private
companies. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2012)
(describing legal issues presented by VC secondary markets).
89.
See Rauterberg, supra note 10, at 1129 (terming private companies “the dark matter of the
corporate universe”).
90.
See Yves Smith, Fake “Unicorns” Are Running Roughshod Over the Venture Capital
Industry, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 14, 2018), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/11/fake-unicorns-arerunning-over-the-venture-capital-industry.html [https://perma.cc/YQ2F-6FSJ] (describing “pervasive
overvaluation” of startups); Donald C. Langevoort & Hillary A. Sale, Corporate Adolescence: Why Did
“We” Not Work?, 99 TEX. L.REV. 1347, 1357 (2021) (noting the incentives among startup participants
to inflate valuations and observing that Uber’s public offering price was “well below the company’s
private valuations”).
91.
See Langevoort & Sale, supra note 90 (detailing the conflicts of interest at WeWork); JOHN
CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VALLEY STARTUP (2018) (describing the
Theranos fraud).
92.
See Langevoort & Sale, supra note 90, at 1366 (identifying the potential vulnerability of latestage investors in VC-funded firms).
93.
Jones, supra note 15. See also Amy Deen Westbrook, We(’re) Working on Corporate
Governance: Stakeholder Vulnerability in Unicorn Companies, 23 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 505, 521 (2021)
(detailing governance problems at startups including lack of board independence and diversity, dual
class stock and a “lack of internal discipline”).
94.
Langevoort & Sale, supra note 90.
95.
See, e.g., Gary Spencer, Comment, Financial Beasts: How Breeding Unicorns May Bring
Big Consequences, 35 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 47, 55 (2015) (identifying the problems of unicorns as
including overvaluation, excessive risk, and possibility of becoming a “[u]nicorpse”) (citation omitted).
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Shareholder agreements play an important role in VC-funded startups.96
Their primary role is to allocate the economic rights of shareholders, rights
that become complex as the startup proceeds through multiple rounds of
financing.97 As in the close corporation, startups use shareholder agreements
to allocate the right to board representation among investors.98 A
shareholder agreement may provide VC investors with a degree of
operational contract such as the power to veto certain corporate transactions.
Depending on the relative bargaining strength of the founder and the VC
funds, the agreement may grant investors control rights disproportionate to
their economic interest in the company.99
Importantly, shareholder agreements are not just used to allocate control
and cash flow rights between the founder and the VC funds. They are also
used to address a variety of additional issues and often extend to other
investors.100 Shareholder agreements may provide shareholders with
preemptive rights or registration rights. They may limit how shareholders
can exercise their voting power.101 They typically describe the scope of
shareholders’ inspection rights and designate those shareholders who can
exercise such rights.102 They often include detailed provisions that apply in
the context of a merger such as drag-along rights and appraisal waivers.
Shareholder agreements may specify a forum for litigation of shareholder

96.
Common shareholder agreements in the startup context include voting agreements, stock
purchase agreements, and investors’ rights agreements. See NVCA, supra note 8. See generally Corp.
L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y.C., The Enforceability and Effectiveness of Typical
Shareholders Agreement Provisions, 65 BUS. LAW. 1153 (2010) (describing common types of issues
addressed by shareholder agreements and evaluating their enforceability).
97.
See generally Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the
Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281 (2003)
(describing the sophisticated terms in these contracts addressing cash flow rights, board rights, voting
rights, and liquidation rights).
98.
Id.; Rauterberg, supra note 10.
99.
See, e.g., Daniel T. Janis, Venture Capital Shareholder Agreements—More Attention Now,
Less
Heartache
Later,
ABA:
BUS.
L.
TODAY
(May
18,
2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2017/05/03_janis/
[https://perma.cc/SW5W-BBAV] (“The ultimate purpose of a shareholder agreement is to provide a VC
with rights above and beyond what it would have simply by virtue of its overall percentage ownership
of the company.”).
100. See, e.g., DOUGLAS YOUNG, BAKER & MCKENZIE, IBA GUIDE ON SHAREHOLDERS’
AGREEMENTS, https://nanopdf.com/download/shareholders-agreements_pdf [https://perma.cc/P3Z3MSV2] (detailing common provisions in California shareholder agreements).
101. See John F. Coyle, Altering Rules, Cumulative Voting, and Venture Capital, 2016 UTAH L.
REV. 595, 606–08 (explaining how participants in California corporations can use shareholder
agreements to eliminate the statutorily required cumulative voting).
102. See generally Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y.C., supra note 96, at 1182–85;
Fan, supra note 82, at 598. See also Shapira, supra note 14, at 150–51 (describing efforts by startup
companies to limit employee use of inspection rights through shareholder agreements).
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disputes or select arbitration in lieu of litigation. 103 In some cases, they
include limitations on or waivers of the right to bring litigation, including
litigation alleging breaches of fiduciary duties.104 As the National Venture
Capital Association website demonstrates, it is common practice for a single
corporation to use a number of different shareholder agreements, each of
which addresses different elements of the shareholders’ relationship with his
or her fellow shareholders and the corporation.105
Shareholder agreements operate as governance devices in two ways.
First, they serve as contractual mechanisms for allocating control and
determining board representation.106 Corporate law provides shareholders
with the power to vote on a variety of issues including the election of
directors, the amendment of the charter and bylaws, and the approval of
certain corporate transactions. Shareholders can commit, pursuant to a
shareholder agreement, to vote their stock together or in a designated
manner, forming a control coalition. Shareholders can also designate
officers or directors pursuant to a shareholder agreement, taking those
decisions outside the standard process.107
Second, shareholder agreements allocate shareholder rights and, as a
result, the extent to which minority shareholders can hold officers, directors
and controlling shareholders accountable. Corporate governance is
addressed, in large part, to the agency problems that arise from the
separation of ownership and control. As noted above, these agency
problems are particularly pervasive in startups. A variety of governance
mechanisms—from independent directors to shareholder voting, inspection
and litigation rights—are designed to mitigate these agency problems, and
shareholder agreements are used, in startups, to reduce shareholder power
to use these mechanisms. Notably, shareholder benefit not only from their
individual rights but from the power to act collectively to identify and
respond to problems. As a result, shareholders may be damaged not just by

103. See, e.g., Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y.C., supra note 96, at 1201–02
(discussing considerations in drafting arbitration provisions); Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526
S.W.3d 428, 443 (Tex. 2017) (upholding forum-selection provision in shareholder agreement).
104. Cf. Neubauer v. Goldfarb, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 218, 225 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that, under
California law, shareholder agreement purporting to waive shareholders’ right to sue for breach of
fiduciary duty was void).
105. NVCA, supra note 8.
106. Gabriel Rauterberg focuses on this use of shareholder agreements. See Rauterberg, supra
note 10.
107. The use of shareholder agreements to allocate decisional rights raises additional concerns
about the extent to which shareholders that exercise those rights are subject to fiduciary duties. See id.
at 1168 (observing that shareholders acting collectively raises the issue of “[w]hen . . . do the signatories
to a shareholder agreement owe other shareholders fiduciary duties?”).
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contractual limitations on their own rights but by agreements entered into
by their fellow shareholders.108
Why do startups use shareholder agreements for private ordering rather
than the charter and bylaws? There are at least three reasons. First,
shareholder agreements are more flexible. They can be implemented and
amended without the formalities associated with amending the charter and
bylaws. In particular, charter provisions require board approval, and the
board’s fiduciary duties to all shareholders may create a “bargaining
friction.”109 Shareholder agreements require no formal action by the
corporation or the board and can be implemented and amended by
shareholders acting in their individual capacity.
Second, shareholder agreements are opaque.110 Corporate charters, even
for private corporations, are public documents.111 Similarly, shareholders
have a near-absolute right to inspect the current bylaws of the corporation
without relying on any statutory inspection rights.112 By contrast,
shareholder agreements have the legal status of contracts, and, as such, they
do not need to be disclosed to nonsignatories or filed with the state,
qualifying them as a type of stealth corporate governance.113 Significantly,
shareholder agreements allow some shareholders to obtain economic or

108. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 936–39 (Del. 2003)
(concluding that voting agreement entered into by controlling stockholders had preclusive effect on
merger to the detriment of minority stockholders).
109. See Rauterberg, supra note 10, at 1147 (identifying this concern).
110. See id. at 21 (“Firms with a secrecy interest in their governance may thus prefer a shareholder
agreement.”).
111. See Fan, supra note 82, at 611 (observing that “[a]lthough anyone can obtain a corporation’s
certificate of incorporation from the Secretary of State of Delaware, there is a fee, and the certificate of
incorporation does not include significant information about the company”) (footnotes omitted).
112. See, e.g., 13 PENNSYLVANIA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA Corporations § 110, Lexis (database
updated Sept. 2021) (“explaining that “[t]he statute does not refer expressly to the bylaws because the
shareholders have an absolute right to be supplied with a copy of the currently effective text of the
bylaws without going through this statutory procedure regarding inspection”); Articles of Incorporation
and
Shareholder
Agreements:
What’s
the
Difference?,
LEGALNATURE,
https://www.legalnature.com/guides/articles-of-incorporation-and-shareholder-agreements-whats-thedifference [https://perma.cc/W5B5-DCV2] (“[Corporate charter and bylaw provisions] are available for
the public to inspect while the shareholder agreement is typically private, shared only by the parties
involved . . . .”); 14 N.Y. JUR. 2D Business Relationships § 386 (“While the right of a stockholder to
examine the bylaws of the company is not absolute but rests in the discretion of the court, a strong case
will be required to deny an inspection since the bylaws constitute a part of the contract between the
stockholder and the corporation, and the stockholder should be permitted to know the extent and terms
of the stockholder’s and the corporation’s obligation to each other.”). But see Rauterberg, supra note 10,
at 1129 (observing that private companies “are not required to publicly disclose any instrument of
governance beyond filing their charter with the Secretary of State”).
113. A public corporation may be required to disclose a material shareholder agreement to which
it is a party under the federal securities laws. See Rauterberg, supra note 10, at 1148 (describing
disclosure requirement).
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control rights well beyond those that they appear to possess based on the
corporation’s charter provisions.114
Third, shareholder agreements have at least the potential to go further
than the charter and bylaws in modifying the rights and powers established
by corporate statutes. Although the law is not clear, there is some support
for the proposition that shareholder agreements can be used to modify what
would otherwise be mandatory provisions of corporate law. As a result,
commentators have argued that corporations have broader power to engage
in private ordering by using shareholder agreements.115 For startups that are
seeking to depart from governance best practices and, in particular, for
founders and VC funds seeking to limit their accountability to other
shareholders, shareholder agreements are particularly attractive.
Private corporations are not required to file shareholder agreements with
state or federal regulators.116 As a result, it is not possible to ascertain the
full range of shareholder agreements in existence or their terms. Some
guidance on their use is available, however. The National Venture Capital
Association posts a variety of model forms of shareholder agreements.117
The Corporation Law Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York published a report in 2010 summarizing typical provisions in
shareholder agreements.118 Many provisions are commonplace in such
agreements despite a paucity of case law on their enforceability. 119 Gabriel
Rauterberg collected data from shareholder agreements filed in connection
with the IPO process and estimates and reports, based on this data, that
roughly 55% of pre-IPO companies were governed by a shareholder
agreement.120 Notably, although shareholder agreements are used primarily
in private corporations, Rauterberg finds a significant number of
shareholder agreements that continue in effect even after a company goes
public.121
As noted above, although corporate law historically treated shareholder
agreements with suspicion,122 their legal treatment, by both statutes and
courts, has evolved. Today, corporate statutes expressly authorize some
114. See, e.g., Janis, supra note 99 (“Shareholder agreements give VCs extensive rights, far
beyond the economics reflected in a company’s charter.”).
115. See Rauterberg, supra note 10, at 1167 (“Certain rules are mandatory, but only for the charter
and bylaws, not shareholder agreements; some rules bind all three.”).
116. Id. at 4.
117. NVCA, supra note 8.
118. Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y.C., supra note 96, at 1172–94.
119. See, e.g., id. at 1182 (explaining that “case law concerning the enforceability of drag-along
rights is scarce”).
120. Rauterberg, supra note 10, at 1149.
121. Id.
122. See supra note 77.
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types of shareholder agreements. For example, the Delaware statute and the
MBCA provide that voting agreements among shareholders are specifically
enforceable.123 The statutes do not limit voting agreements to close
corporations. Although at one time the statutes imposed various procedural
requirements for voting agreements to be valid—such as requiring that they
be publicly disclosed and limiting their duration to ten years—subsequent
amendments removed these requirements.124 Courts have relied on these
statutes125 to uphold shareholder voting agreements as long as their terms
are sufficiently clear.126
MBCA section 7.32 authorizes shareholder agreements that address a
variety of issues beyond voting, including agreements that limit the
discretion of the board of directors, govern corporate distributions, and
establish who shall serve as directors or officers.127 Notably, the statute
expressly authorizes shareholder agreements that conflict with other
provisions in the statute, stating that an agreement that complies with
section 7.32 is valid “even though it is inconsistent with one or more other
provisions of this Act.”128 To be valid under the MBCA, a voting agreement
must be set forth in the charter or bylaws and approved by all shareholders
or in a written agreement signed by all the shareholders. The existence of
an agreement must also be noted on the share certificates.129
Although section 7.32 is not part of a separate close corporation statute,
the drafters of the MBCA appear to have intended it to play an analogous
role because the provision originally provided that shareholder agreements
authorized by its terms would cease to be effective if the corporation went
123. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.31 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218 (2021).
124. See, e.g., DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS §
3.02 (2020) (explaining that limitations on the duration of voting agreements and requirement that they
be publicly disclosed have disappeared in most states).
125. See, e.g., Salamone v. Gorman, 106 A.3d 354, 383 (Del. 2014) (explaining that a “Voting
Agreement acts as a contractual overlay [of section 212(a)] pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 218(c)”).
126. See, e.g., Rohe v. Reliance Training Network, Inc., C.A. No. 17992, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS
108, at *57 (“[A]lthough Delaware law provides stockholders with a great deal of flexibility to enter
into voting agreements, our courts rightly hesitate to construe a contract as disabling a majority of a
corporate electorate from changing the board of directors unless that reading of the contract is certain
and unambiguous.”) (footnote omitted).
127. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.32 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). Delaware law contains no
similar provision.
128. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.32(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). Some commentary suggests
public policy limits in the statute would preclude a shareholder agreement under the Act that purported
to eliminate director fiduciary duties. See William F. Griffin, Jr., Fiduciary Duties of Officers, Directors,
and Business Owners, DAVIS, MALM & D’AGOSTINE, PC 38–39 (Jan. 2011),
https://www.davismalm.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Griffin_CH8_Fiduciary_Duties.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KQ4T-Y5AX].
129. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.32(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). Rauterberg, supra note 10,
at 26 n.99.
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public.130 In 2017, the ABA eliminated this restriction, however, and the
current form of the provision is not limited to private companies.131 A
number of state statutes, retain the restriction limiting shareholder
agreements to private companies.132 The Delaware statute does not
explicitly authorize shareholder agreements other than voting agreements,
although various sections of the statute refer to shareholder agreements,
implicitly recognizing their potential validity.133
Judicial treatment of shareholder agreements is limited, particularly
outside the close corporation context.134 The enforceability of such
agreements raises several issues. The first issue is whether the agreement
complies with the necessary formalities.135 The second issue is whether it
complies with the standard requirements of contract law.136 The third issue
is the one relevant to this Article—whether enforcement of the agreement is
consistent with principles of corporate law; specifically, the degree to which
participants in a corporation can modify corporate law requirements by
private contract.
Two potentially conflicting principles apply. On the one hand, corporate
law imposes a hierarchy of authority. Under corporate law, the statute is
supreme, the terms of the charter must comply with the statute, and the terms
of the bylaws are limited by the charter. One way of understanding this
hierarchy is to conclude that a shareholder agreement is not valid if it

130. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.32(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003) (providing that “[a]n
agreement authorized by this section shall cease to be effective when shares of the corporation are listed
on a national securities exchange or regularly traded in a market maintained by one or more members of
a national or affiliated securities association”).
131. Rauterberg, supra note 10, at 1153 n.102; MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.32 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2020).
132. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-732(D) (2021); FLA. STAT. § 607.0732(4) (2020); cf.
Ramos v. Estrada, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833, 836 (Ct. App. 1992) (upholding enforcement of shareholder
agreement even though corporation was not technically a close corporation).
133. See, e.g., Bonanno v. VTB Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 10681, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, at *47
(Feb. 8, 2016) (describing the statute’s “distinct itemization of shareholder agreements as a class of
documents that, in addition to corporate charters and bylaws, fall within the given regulatory ambit”).
134. See, e.g., Abregov v. Lawrence, No. G056629, 2020 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1826, at *7
(2020) (holding that the rules governing the enforceability of shareholder agreements are different for
statutory close corporations than for other corporations). One likely reason is the limited extent to which
participants in startups engage in litigation. See infra notes 220–221 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Booker v. Humphreys, 73 Va. Cir. 543, 551 (2007) (refusing to enforce shareholder
agreement that did not comply with the Virginia statutory requirements that it be in writing and signed
by all the shareholders).
136. See, e.g., Dick v. Koski Pro. Grp., P.C., 95 N.W.2d 321, 354 (Neb. 2020), opinion modified
on denial of reh'g, 953 N.W.2d 257 (Neb. 2021) (“Shareholder agreements are construed according to
the principles of the law of contracts.”).
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conflicts with any of the foregoing instruments.137 Specifically, a
shareholder agreement cannot be used to override a statutory
requirement.138 This approach finds support in the language of MBCA
section 7.32 and similar statutory provisions that expressly authorize certain
shareholder agreements even if they conflict with other sections of the
statute. If a contract were sufficient to override a mandatory statute, this
language would be unnecessary.
On the other hand, shareholder agreements (unlike corporate charters
and bylaws) are contracts, and outside corporate law courts generally accept
the premise that private parties may, by contract, waive statutory, and even
constitutional rights.139 Several courts suggest that the same analysis applies
to shareholder agreements,140 at least so long as the waiver of statutory
rights in a shareholder agreement is “clear and unmistakable.”141 Under this
analysis, a shareholder agreement could implement private ordering
provisions that would not be permitted in the charter or bylaws.142 This
analysis is further supported by recent cases identifying freedom of contract
as consistent with the objectives of corporate law.143
137. As the Delaware Chancery Court explained in Gaskill, “The by-laws must succumb to the
superior authority of the charter; the charter if it conflicts with the statute must give way; and the statute,
if it conflicts with the constitution, is void.” Gaskill v. Gladys Belle Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 289, 296 (1929).
But see Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., C.A. No. 354, 2020, 2021 Del. LEXIS 286,
at *28–29 (Del. Sept. 13, 2021) (describing and rejecting petitioners’ argument that “[b]ecause the
charter is higher up in the corporate hierarchy than a stockholders agreement, . . . Authentix cannot use
the Stockholders Agreement to impose a limitation that could not be included in the corporation’s
charter.”).
138. See Schroeder v. Buhannic, C.A. No. 2017-0746, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1444 (Jan. 10, 2018),
at *10 (explaining that a shareholder agreement is invalid if it conflicts with the statute).
139. See G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431, 475–
80 (1993) (describing U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis of private parties’ power to waive various statutory
and constitutional protections).
140. See Bonanno v. VTB Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 10681, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, at *43–49
(Feb. 8, 2016) (allowing enforcement of provision in shareholder agreement waiving shareholders’ right
to litigate in Delaware courts, despite explicit statutory language prohibiting such a waiver in a corporate
charter or bylaw).
141. See, e.g., Windmill Inns of Am., Inc. v. Cauvin, 450 P.3d 1013, 1019 (Or. Ct. App. 2019)
(citation omitted); accord Kortüm v. Webasto Sunroofs Inc., 769 A.2d 113, 125 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(footnote omitted) (“There can be no waiver of a statutory right unless that waiver is clearly and
affirmatively expressed in the relevant document.”); ); see also Manti, 2021 Del. LEXIS 286, at *47
(concluding that waiver is permissible where stockholders “freely and knowingly consented to waive
their appraisal rights in exchange for valuable consideration”).
142. See Rohe v. Reliance Training Network, Inc., C.A. No. 17992, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 108, at
*58 n.49 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2000) (“[S]tockholders can bind themselves contractually in a stockholders
agreement in a manner that cannot be permissibly accomplished through a certificate of incorporation.”).
143. See, e.g., EV3, Inc. v. Lesh, 114 A.3d 527, 529 n.3 (Del. 2014) (quoting Libeau v. Fox, 880
A.2d 1049, 1056-57 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd in pertinent part, 892 A.2d 1068 (Del. 2006)) (“When parties
have ordered their affairs voluntarily through a binding contract, Delaware law is strongly inclined to
respect their agreement, and will only interfere upon a strong showing that dishonoring the contract is
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An additional consideration is that, in several cases, the shareholder
agreements address the rights of preferred stockholders. In upholding the
validity of these agreements, the courts have reasoned that preferred
stockholders’ rights are primarily contractual rather than statutory. Thus the
court in Ford Holdings observed that that DGCL section 262, providing
shareholders with statutory appraisal rights, is a mandatory provision of
Delaware corporate law.144 The court concluded that the appraisal rights of
preferred stockholders could nonetheless be modified by contract.145 The
court expressly conditioned its holding on the fact that “preferred stock is a
very special case.”146 Similarly, the court in Metromedia explained that the
“proposition of contract interpretation for preferred stock is interwoven with
a stockholder’s statutory right of appraisal.” 147 As a result, the court
concluded that a contractual provision establishing the fair value of the
preferred stock was not inconsistent with either the language or the policy
of section 262.148 In Fletcher International Ltd. v. ION Geophysical Corp.,
the court applied similar reasoning to conclude that the contractual duties
owed to preferred stockholders in the case supplanted any fiduciary duty
claims that might result in additional remedies.149
When the cases addressing the rights of preferred stockholders and those
involving close corporations are excluded, the number of decisions
evaluating the permissible scope of shareholder agreements is tiny. 150
required to vindicate a public policy interest even stronger than freedom of contract.”); see also What’s
the Purpose of a Shareholders’ Agreement, BELLAS & WACHOWSKI https://www.bellaswachowski.com/whats-the-purpose-of-a-shareholders-agreement.html [https://perma.cc/3XVT-T76Q]
(“Illinois has a strong history of upholding shareholders’ agreements pursuant to the underlying policy
regarding freedom of contract.”); Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964).
144. In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred Stock, 698 A.2d 973, 976 (Del. Ch. 1997)
(explaining that “[a]mong the[] mandatory provisions of Delaware law is Section 262”).
145. Id. at 975 (“[I]nsofar as preferred stock is concerned, the provisions of Section 262 may be
modified by provisions of the certificate of rights . . . .”). See Hintmann v. Fred Weber, Inc., C.A. No.
12839, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26, at *36 (Feb. 17, 1998) (questioning whether the reasoning in Ford
Holdings could be used to limit the rights of “common, as opposed to preferred,” stockholders).
146. Ford Holdings, 698 A.2d at 977 (footnote omitted).
147. In re Appraisal of Metromedia Int’l Grp., Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 899 (Del. Ch. 2009).
148. Id. at 900.
149. Fletcher Int’l, Ltd. v. ION Geophysical Corp., C.A. No. 5109, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125,
*27 (May 28, 2010) (footnote omitted) (holding that asserted fiduciary duty claims “arise out of and are
superfluous to the breach of contract claims”).
150. The absence of case law does not appear to limit the use of these provisions. See, e.g.,
Shapira, supra note 14, at 151 (explaining that “a burgeoning practice among growing start-ups is to
sign employees on an inspection rights waiver before granting said employees stock options”); George
S. Geis, Information Litigation in Corporate Law, 71 ALA. L. REV. 407, 427 (2019) (footnote omitted)
(“Corporations are even starting to include conditions in employee stock grants that require workers to
waive future shareholder inspection rights.”); Rolfe Winkler, Startup Employees Invoke Obscure Law
to Open Up Books, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2016, 1:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/startup-
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Nonetheless, the cases provide some support for the proposition that
shareholder agreements can be used more expansively than charter or bylaw
provisions to tailor a corporation’s governance structure. For example,
courts have generally held that shareholder inspection rights comprise a
mandatory provision of corporate law such that charter or bylaw provisions
purporting to limit or eliminate inspection rights are invalid.151 Nonetheless,
dicta in several cases suggests that courts may uphold waivers of
shareholder inspection rights in shareholder agreements.152 In Juul Labs,
Inc. v. Grove, the Delaware Chancery court failed to reach the issue of
whether a shareholder agreement purporting to waive statutory inspection
rights was valid under Delaware law.153 The court specifically noted the
competing claims as to the provision’s validity, but observed that there were
“arguments for distinguishing between provisions that appear in those
documents and waivers in private agreements.”154
In Bonanno, the court considered the validity of a forum selection in a
shareholder agreement.155 Notably, the Delaware statute authorizes forum
selection provisions in the charter and bylaws but provides that such
provisions cannot select an exclusive non-Delaware forum for the litigation
of internal corporate claims.156 Nonetheless, the Bonanno court concluded
that a shareholder agreement providing for exclusive litigation in New York
did not contravene public policy.157 The court relied in part on a synopsis
included with the bill that stated “Section 115 is not intended, however, to
prevent the application of any such provision in a stockholders agreement
employees-invoke-obscure-law-to-open-up-books-1464082202 (quoting executive compensation
attorney Richard Grimm as stating that “[s]ome companies are now pushing employees to waive their
right to inspect the books as a condition for receiving stock awards”).
151. See e.g., State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 143 A. 257, 260 (Del. 1926) (holding
that a charter provision that “permits the directors to deny any examination of the company’s records by
a stockholder is unauthorized and ineffective”); Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Pan Ocean Navigation,
Inc., 535 A.2d 1357, 1359 (Del. 1987) (citations omitted) (“[The shareholders’ right of inspection] can
only be taken away by statutory enactment.”); BBC Acquisition Corp. v. Durr-Fillauer Medical, Inc.,
623 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 1992) (“[A shareholder’s inspection rights] cannot be abridged or abrogated by
an act of the corporation.”).
152. See e.g., Kortüm v. Webasto Sunroofs Inc., 769 A.2d 113, 125 (Del. Ch. 2000) (observing
that the shareholders agreement “does not expressly provide for a waiver of statutory inspection rights
[and] there can be no waiver of a statutory right unless that waiver is clearly and affirmatively expressed
. . ..”); Schoon v. Troy Corp., C.A. No. 1677-N, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 123, at *7 (rejecting argument
that shareholder’s section 220 rights were defined by the stock purchase agreement where “[t]he
agreement did not in any way, explicitly or implicitly, contractually limit the information that must be
provided to Steel in the exercise of its statutorily protected inspection rights under Section 220”).
153. Juul Labs, Inc. v. Grove, 238 A.3d 904 (Del. Ch. 2020).
154. Id. at 902 (footnote omitted).
155. Bonanno v. VTB Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 10681, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, at *47 (Feb. 8,
2016).
156. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2021).
157. Bonanno, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, at *48.
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or other writing signed by the stockholder against whom the provision is to
be enforced.”158 The court also noted, however, that, unlike some other
provisions of the Delaware statute, section 115 did not explicitly prohibit
such provisions in a shareholder agreement.159 Notably, the two provisions
to which the court referred affirmatively authorize shareholder action by
written agreement, in contrast to the overwhelming majority of statute
sections that only address the extent to which private ordering may be
effected through the charter, the bylaws, or both and which are silent as to
shareholder agreements.
Another example is appraisal rights. In Manti Holdings LLC v. Authentix
Acquisition Co., the Delaware Supreme Court held that shareholders could
waive their appraisal rights through a shareholder agreement.160 The court
concluded that, because the parties were sophisticated, represented by
counsel, and received valuable consideration, the shareholder agreement
was a valid contract.161 Although the petitioners argued that the Delaware
appraisal statute was a mandatory component of Delaware law, the court
rejected this argument, concluding that nothing in the statute precluded
petitioners from waiving their appraisal rights.162 Critically the court
reasoned that the shareholder agreement was a personal waiver, holding that
it “did not restrict the appraisal rights of the classes of stock held by the
Petitioners.”163 Instead the court concluded that the petitioners had simply
agreed by contract “to forbear from exercising that right.”164
The problem with analyzing shareholder agreements as personal
waivers, as the Manti court did, is that a shareholder’s corporate governance
rights affect the interests of other shareholders as well as the rights and
responsibilities of the corporation’s officers, directors, and nonshareholder
stakeholders. This is particularly true when the shareholder agreement limits
the use of governance mechanisms designed to promote corporate
accountability. A shareholder’s agreement limiting the authority of
shareholders to remove sitting directors reduces the potential accountability
of the board. An agreement to waive inspection rights prevents shareholders
from overseeing the corporation’s financial condition and responding to
158. Id. at *46 n.131 (citing Del. S.B. 75 syn., 148th Gen. Assem. (2015)).
159. Id. at *47 (referring to “other DGCL provisions’ distinct itemization of shareholder
agreements as a class of documents that, in addition to corporate charters and bylaws, fall within the
given regulatory ambit”).
160. Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., C.A. No. 354, 2020, 2021 Del. LEXIS
286, at *4 (Sept. 13, 2021).
161. Id.
162. Id. at *33–34. Nor did the court view the waiver as inconsistent with public policy. Id. at
*38–39.
163. Id. at *25.
164. Id. at *26.
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potential problems. An agreement to forsake appraisal rights affects the
terms of future transactions.
It is also misleading to characterize shareholder agreements as purely
personal if they contain terms to which all shareholders must agree. As
noted above, many statutes including the MBCA require that shareholders
unanimously approve a shareholder agreement. Similarly, corporations may
require that shareholders agree to the terms of a shareholder agreement as a
condition of acquiring stock. If, however, all shareholders waive their
inspection rights, their appraisal rights, or their rights to pursue fiduciary
duty litigation, then no shareholder is capable of exercising those rights and,
as a practical matter, the corporation has eliminated them. Thus, in Manti,
if all shareholders waive their appraisal rights, the common stock has no
appraisal rights. To the extent the elimination of statutory appraisal rights is
inconsistent with public policy, the prospect of obtaining this result through
a contractual waiver is problematic.165
To be sure, some shareholder agreements are more limited in scope. In
In re Altor Bioscience Corp., the court considered a covenant in a
shareholder agreement waiving the plaintiffs’ right to sue.166 The plaintiffs
argued that enforcement of the covenants would essentially insulate the
defendants from claims of breach of fiduciary duty and were therefore
invalid.167 In evaluating and rejecting this claim, the court observed that, in
the case before it, the agreements only bound the plaintiffs; other
shareholders were able to sue and were, in fact, asserting similar claims to
those the plaintiffs sought to assert.168 Consequently, the court concluded
that enforcement of the agreements against the plaintiffs was not contrary
to public policy.169 Even this analysis may fall short, however. If shareholder
agreements are used to eliminate the rights of minority or disempowered

165. For arguments that statutory appraisal rights serve a valuable role in disciplining deal price
and quality, see Audra Boone, Brian Broughman & Antonio J. Macias, Merger Negotiations in the
Shadow of Judicial Appraisal, 62 J.L. & ECON. 281, 285 (2019) (finding that “a strong appraisal regime
increases returns to target shareholders”); Scott Callahan, Darius Palia & Eric Talley, Appraisal
Arbitrage and Shareholder Value, 3 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 147 (2018) (shareholders tend to receive higher
premia as the strength of the appraisal remedy increases).
166. Telephonic Rulings of the Court on Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment and
Motions to Dismiss, In re Altor Bioscience Corp., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1103 (2019) (No. 2017-0466).
167. Katherine Henderson, Amy Simmerman & Brad Sorrels, Appraisal Claim Waivers and Deal
Covenants,
HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE,
Aug.
26,
2019,
https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/harvard-082619.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y4N-FVSK].
168. Katherine L. Henderson, Amy L. Simmerman, Brad Sorrels, Ryan J. Greecher & Toni
Wormald, Delaware Court Addresses Private Company Deal Issues, WILSON SONSINI (Aug. 13, 2019),
https://www.wsgr.com/en/insights/delaware-court-of-chancery-addresses-significant-issues-regardingprivate-company-deal-litigation.html [https://perma.cc/5JBE-3JLR].
169. Id.
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shareholders, the fact that other shareholders have the technical ability to
assert these claims does not ensure accountability.
III. SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS AS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. The Corporate/Contract Paradigm
As noted above, courts and commentators increasingly describe
corporate law as “contractual.” The contract analogy is imperfect, however.
As William Bratton and Michael Wachter recognize, the law has struggled
to reconcile “two great private law paradigms, corporate law and contract
law.”170 Shareholder agreements sit uneasily between these two paradigms.
On the one hand, they purport to function as contracts and courts have
analyzed them according to principles of contract law. On the other hand,
the powers and rights that they address are the product of corporate law.171
There are fundamental differences between the two paradigms. Contracts
generally affect only the rights of the contracting parties; contract law
explicitly disavows, in most cases, the proposition that a contract creates
rights or obligations with respect to third parties.172 Contracts provide the
primary source of rights and responsibilities between the parties thereto, and
the terms to which the parties can agree are infinitely customizable.173 To
the extent that statutory provisions and public policy considerations limit
the permissible scope of contract terms, those limitations are minimal.174
Contracts are self-defining in terms of their scope—they determine the
duration of the obligations they impose, the manner in which the contract
can be modified,175 and the circumstances under which the contract may be
terminated.176
170. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1815, 1820 (2013).
171. See also David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the
Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 152 (2013) (describing corporations as neither public nor
private but “corporate”).
172. See, e.g., Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 428, 445 (Tex. 2017)
(concluding that nonsignatories to a shareholder agreement lacked the power to enforce its terms).
173. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000) (“The parties to a contract are free
to be as whimsical or fanciful as they like in describing the promise to be performed, the consideration
to be given in return for the promise, and the duration of the agreement.”).
174. See id. (observing that legal constraints on permissible types of contracts—such as promises
to commit a crime—are “relatively narrow areas of proscription”).
175. See, e.g., Pinto Tech, 526 S.W.3d at 443 (holding that signatory to a shareholder agreement
was bound by changes to that agreement pursuant to its terms).
176. The potential for termination is a key distinction between shareholder agreements and charter
and bylaw provisions. A charter or bylaw continues in effect unless and until it is amended or removed.
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Consent is a central component of contract law.177 Contract law “requires
that the parties have an understanding of the terms to which they have
agreed.”178 A binding contract requires affirmative assent; silence or
inaction is not generally sufficient.179 The requirement of consent limits the
ability of one party unilaterally to modify the contract.180 And, where a
contract purports to waive a party’s statutory or constitutional rights, that
waiver must be explicit.
Corporate law, by contrast, is structural.181 Statutes prescribe the
necessary formalities to form a corporation and, once those formalities are
complied with, establish the corporation as a distinct legal entity. 182
Corporate law also specifies the entity’s critical features.183 It identifies the
key participants in a corporation—the officers, directors, and
shareholders—and allocates rights and responsibilities among those parties
based on status, not agreement. The board of directors, for example, has
primary authority to operate the corporation. Shareholders have the right to
elect directors, the economic right to the corporation’s residual value, and
the right to vote on certain structural changes. The board and the
shareholders must act jointly to undertake actions such as amending the
charter or approving a merger.

Shareholder agreements may provide for formal termination of the contract or revocation of an
individual shareholders’ agreement to its terms. Contractual silence on these points need not eliminate
the potential for revocation. Thus in Roam-Tel Partners, the Chancery court held that, in a short-form
merger, absent prejudice to the company, a stockholder could revoke his prior waiver of appraisal rights
in a shareholder agreement so long as the revocation occurred within the statutory period prescribed for
perfecting those rights. Roam-Tel Partners v. AT&T Mobility Wireless Holdings Operations, Inc., C.A.
5745-VCS, 2010 WL 5276991 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2010).
177. See, e.g., Blake D. Morant, Law, Literature, and Contract: An Essay in Realism, 4 MICH. J.
OF RACE & L. 1, 10 (1998) (footnote omitted) (consent is “a mandatory requisite of any valid
agreement”); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA.
L. REV. 821 (1992) (describing importance of consent in contract theory and identifying circumstances
under which parties may be understood to consent to contractual default rules); Orit Gan, The Many
Faces of Contractual Consent, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 615, 616 (2017) (“The concept of consent lies at the
heart of contract law.”).
178. Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 99 A.3d 306, 313 (N.J. 2014).
179. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 CMT. A (AM. L. INST. 1981)
(“Acceptance by silence is exceptional.”).
180. See, e.g., Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 280 (Ct. App. 1998); Discover Bank
v. Shea, 827 A.2d 358, 361–63 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 2001).
181. An alternative characterization is that “the corporation is not exclusively contractual but
instead a mix of contract and property.” Robert Anderson IV, A Property Theory of Corporate Law,
2020 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 102 (2020) (footnote omitted).
182. See Ciepley, supra note 171, at 141 (explaining that a corporation relates to outside parties
“as an independent contracting individual, with property and liability wholly separate from its
members”); Id. at 144 (identifying “asset lock-in, entity-shielding, and limited liability” as features that
“preserv[e] the corporation as a separate contracting individual”).
183. Id. at 141.
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Corporate law, unlike contract law, is not susceptible to near-infinite
customization.184 Although many features of the relationship among a
corporation’s participants can be modified by contract, some cannot. A
corporation must have a charter and bylaws. Unless it is a close corporation,
it must be operated under the direction of a board of directors. It must have
the power to issue stock, to amend its governing documents, to enter into
mergers, and to dissolve.
The mechanics of corporate law also differ from those of contract law.
Corporate law supplies default rules that govern the rights and
responsibilities of corporate participants and specify whether those default
rules can be modified and, if so, the required mechanism for doing so. Most
corporation statutes, for example, explicitly provide that statutory
amendments apply to existing corporations.185 Statutes typically require the
joint agreement of the board of directors and the shareholders to approve
charter amendments and, in some cases, require the vote even of a class of
shareholders that does not otherwise have voting rights to approve
amendments that would adversely affect the rights of that class. Statutes
typically provide default rules regarding the power to amend the bylaws and
specify how a corporation can modify that default rule.186
Unlike contract law, corporate law explicitly addresses the rights of third
parties—most importantly through the principle of limited liability, which
provides entity-level treatment for corporate obligations in tort and contract.
Limited liability means that corporate participants—including officers,
directors, and shareholders—are not personally liable for the corporation’s
obligations to third parties such as tort victims. Other aspects of corporate
law also affect third party interests such as statutory provisions that limit the
conditions under which a corporation may pay dividends. Commentators
increasingly argue that corporate law includes responsibilities to

184. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 173 (identifying this as a feature, the numerus clausus
principle, that distinguishes property law from contract law).
185. See Nelson Ferebee Taylor, Evolution of Corporate Combination Law: Policy Issues and
Constitutional Questions, 76 N.C. L. REV. 687, 724–30 (1998) (describing such provisions as standard).
For example, DGCL section 394 reserves to the legislature the right to amend the statute and provides
that such amendments shall be part of the charter of every corporation so long as they do not take away
a remedy or liability that has “been previously incurred.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 (2021).
186. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.057(c) (West 2021) (“A corporation’s board of
directors may amend or repeal bylaws or adopt new bylaws unless: (1) the corporation’s certificate of
formation or this code wholly or partly reserves the power exclusively to the corporation’s shareholders
. . . .”); Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, at 955–56 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(describing the shareholders’ power to amend the bylaws under Delaware law as “indefeasible” and
“sacrosanct”).
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stakeholders such as employees, customers, and suppliers,187 and a majority
of states have adopted constituency statutes that explicitly authorize
directors to consider stakeholder interests in making corporate decisions.188
Finally, corporate law operates under the principle of implied consent
rather than explicit consent.189 Shareholders invest in a corporation with the
constructive knowledge of the rules of the game—the binding effect of the
statute, charter, and bylaws.190 They invest with the knowledge that those
rules can be changed. By investing, they consent to changes that conform to
the corporate law mechanisms for changing these rules, including the
adoption of new statutes, and amendments to the charter and bylaws.191
This consent is necessarily implicit, but it is nonetheless binding. As
then-Chancellor Strine explained in Boilermakers, shareholders cannot be
heard to complain about the board’s unilateral adoption of a bylaw pursuant
to a charter that gives the board the power to amend the bylaws, even if the
shareholder lacked knowledge of the relevant charter provision. 192 Bylaws
are not like contracts; shareholders need not approve them to be bound.
Strine explicitly distinguished the basis on which the shareholders were
bound from traditional contract law, concluding that “the bylaws are not
contractually invalid simply because the board-adopted bylaw lacks the
contemporaneous assent of the stockholders.”193
The role of implied consent highlights “the tension between corporate
law principles—which generally impute to members of the corporation
knowledge and acceptance of corporate bylaws—and the law of contracts,
187. See, e.g., Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An
Economy That
Serves All
Americans’,
BUS. ROUNDTABLE
(Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-topromote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans
[https://perma.cc/56YA-AFLK]
(stating
that
corporations should be run for the benefit of all stakeholders—customers, employees, suppliers,
communities, and shareholders).
188. Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto & Anne M. Tucker, Institutional
Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 95 (2015) (reporting that, as
of publication date, thirty-three states had constituency statutes).
189. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss of Proposed Intervenors California
Public Employees’ Retirement System and Colorado Public Employees’ Retirement Ass’n, Doris Behr
2012 Irrevocable Tr. v. Johnson & Johnson at 22, 2021 WL 2722569 (D.N.J. May 31, 2019) (No. 19cv-08828) (citation omitted) (explaining that corporate law does not involve the “mutual manifestation
of assent” that is a required component of contract law).
190. See, e.g., Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939–40 (reasoning that shareholders invested with
constructive notice that state law and a company’s “certificates of incorporation gave the boards the
power to adopt and amend bylaws unilaterally” and that such bylaws “are binding on the stockholders”).
191. See Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485, 497–498
(2016) (“Unlike in other contracting contexts, the rationale is not that shareholders have consented to
the terms, but rather that they have consented to the corporate governance structure that gave rise to
them.”).
192. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 955.
193. Id. at 956 (footnote omitted).
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which requires consent to be bound.”194 Implied consent is an efficient
component of corporate law because it means both that shareholders
implicitly consent to the authority delegated to the board of directors to
make operational decisions and that shareholder decisions can be made by
majority vote. Minority interests neither have the power to block a decision
with which they disagree nor the right to exit the corporation as a result of
that disagreement. Limitations on shareholders’ veto and exit rights are a
distinguishing feature of the corporate form and are critical to its capacity
to organize large-scale businesses.195 These features allow passive investors
to finance corporations in a manner that would not be possible through
formal multilateral contracts.
In sum, corporate law is not contract law. Moreover, the structure of
corporate law is directly in tension with the proposition that corporate
participants have unlimited freedom to customize the corporate form to their
particularized needs. This proposition is not in tension with the contractual
theory of corporate law in that corporate law creates specific instruments
for customization, identifies how those instruments can be used, and sets
out limits on the scope of their use. The use of shareholder agreements to
extend customization beyond these limits is not justified by contract
principles. In this next Part, the Article moves from corporate law theory to
practice and considers the practical implications of stealth governance.
B. Problems with Stealth Governance
The preceding sections have described a scope of shareholder
agreements far broader than suggested by the limited number of judicial
decisions analyzing their validity. As Rauterberg and others have observed,
the use of shareholder agreements in VC-funded startups is ubiquitous.
Moreover, these agreements are not limited to future financing
commitments and the allocation of cash flow rights but extend to
quintessential governance matters such as inspection rights, appraisal rights,
and control rights. In short, startups are using shareholder agreements to
disrupt corporate governance.

194. Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 162–163 (3d Cir. 2009).
195. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 388–95 (2003) (defining capital lock-in
and the separation of ownership from control as the “features of corporations that made the corporate
form so useful in the development of modern industrial economies”).
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But disruption is what startups are known for, and it is not necessarily
problematic.196 This subpart addresses the normative questions of whether
shareholder agreements are a desirable tool for private ordering and, if not,
why not. It identifies three key governance values sacrificed by the use of
shareholder agreements: transparency, standardization, and oversight.197
As the title of this Article suggests, the first problem with shareholder
agreements is their lack of transparency.198 To the extent that shareholder
agreements address governance issues, those issues would normally be
addressed in the charter or bylaws and would be visible to the public or, at
a minimum, the corporation’s participants. Similarly, when shareholder
agreements address control or voting rights, they modify the power dynamic
set forth in the publicly available corporate charter. In contrast, shareholder
agreements are typically only disclosed to their signatories, making them
tools of stealth governance. Notably, the ownership, valuation, and
governance structures of startup companies are already opaque. As private
companies, startups raise capital without the disclosure requirements
applicable to publicly traded corporations,199 and the only information that
is available to investors, regulators, and the general public is the information

196. See Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CALIF. L.
REV. 383, 427 (2017) (“Culturally, startups often pride themselves on being disruptive and changing the
world . . ..”).
197. Notably, these governance values are independent of the substantive issue to which the
shareholder agreement is addressed. Accordingly, this section does not consider the merits of particular
governance features such as inspection rights or the limitations on shareholder power to remove
directors. That shareholder agreements identify these features as candidates for private ordering may be
evidence that corporate law should facilitate such private ordering but, as the next Part explains, that
tailoring can and should be done through the charter or bylaws.
198. See, e.g., Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., C.A. No. 354, 2020, 2021 Del.
LEXIS 286, at *79 (Sept. 13, 2021) (Valihura, J., dissenting) (observing that “unlike charters,
[shareholder agreements] are not public documents filed with the Secretary of State”).
199. Exemptions also limit the information received by secondary investors and employees.
Shareholders of private companies can freely resell their stock if they comply with the requirements of
Rule 144. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2020). Similarly, under Rule 701 startup employees who purchase stock
typically do not receive any disclosure other than a copy of the compensation plan. Aran, supra note 85,
at 892–95.
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in the corporate charter200 and on any Form Ds filed with the SEC.201
Shareholder agreements exacerbate that opacity.
The result is problematic for several reasons. The rationale for requiring
public filing of the corporate charter is to make certain basic information
about the corporation available to both investors and third parties who deal
with the corporation. Corporate charters therefore contain information on
the corporation’s key features including its legal purpose, its control
dynamics, and its capital structure. One should be able to determine from
the charter both what a corporation has the power to do and who can
exercise that power. As Gabriel Rauterberg demonstrates, however,
shareholder agreements may create substantial deviations from the terms set
forth in the charter.202 A major investor’s capacity to monitor may be limited
by an agreement to support director candidates chosen by another investor.
An ownership structure that appears to involve shared power may be
undermined by the contractual formation of a control group.
In addition, because investors cannot readily determine the rights and
responsibilities of their fellow investors, they cannot determine who is
responsible for making critical firm decisions.203 The importance of this
determination is heightened because a startup’s complex capital structure
creates “significant divergences in preferences among shareholders.”204
Although the board is “one of the key arenas in which conflicts are resolved
and investments are protected,”205 shareholder agreements can designate
200. As noted above, corporate charters are filed with the state and are publicly available. Bylaws
are not. Concededly a substantial component of private ordering takes place through bylaw provisions.
See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(upholding private ordering through board-adopted bylaw). Notably, however, statutes require a variety
of private ordering provisions to be implemented through charter provisions, a requirement that has the
effect of ensuring their transparency to both investors and third parties. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 102(b)(7) (2021) (requiring director exculpation provisions to be in the charter); § 122(17) (requiring
corporate opportunity doctrine waivers to be in the charter or by action of the board of directors); MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 13.02(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (requiring appraisal waivers to be in the
charter). I have argued elsewhere that, in some cases, the charter may be a more appropriate tool for
private ordering. See Fisch, supra note 20.
201. Any corporation that raises capital in a private placement pursuant to Regulation D must file
a Form D with the Securities and Exchange Commission. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM D,
NOTICE OF EXEMPT OFFERING OF SECURITIES, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf
[https://perma.cc/55JN-CCWW].
202. Rauterberg, supra note 10.
203. The importance to startups of vesting control in a visionary founder has been identified as a
rationale for differential voting rights such as dual class stock. See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Assaf
Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 590 (2016) (defending dualclass stock structures as supporting ability of entrepreneurs to realize their idiosyncratic vision). The
voting rights of each class of stock must be set forth in the charter. Yet shareholder agreements can cause
control rights to differ from those disclosed in the charter.
204. Pollman, supra note 1, at 160. As Pollman notes, contract terms can create conflicts not just
between common and preferred shareholders but between common shareholders. Id.
205. Id. at 183.
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individual directors or grant investors the power to designate or remove
directors irrespective of their stated voting rights. The opacity of
shareholder agreements also prevents investors from identifying conflicts of
interest and accurately ascertaining the risk associated with the company.
As Gornall and Strebulaev demonstrate empirically, contractual rights that
are “virtually invisible to employees under the current disclosure regime,
have a dramatic influence on the value of the common stock.”206
Nonetheless, existing law does not require the disclosure of such rights if
they are based on shareholder agreements.207
The value of transparency is not limited to protecting investors. It also
protects the public by providing a level of oversight over a corporation and
its practices. One explanation for problematic business practices among
startups, including illegal and unethical practices, and even outright fraud,
is the insulation provided by the absence of disclosure.208 As Ann Lipton
explains, transparency plays a role in “protecting both employees and
surrounding communities from corporate antisocial activity.”209
Shareholder agreements also sacrifice the standardization of corporate
governance provisions. As noted above, there is limited case law on the
validity of specific provisions in shareholder agreements.210 Because they
are not public, they do not provide similar network effects as charter and
bylaw provisions which enable firms to see and copy each other’s
governance provisions and allow private ordering innovations to
disseminate among firms.211 These efforts are aided by judicial decisions
such as Boilermakers and ATP which provide firms with clear guidance on
the validity of such innovations.212

206. Aran, supra note 85, at 911–12 (citing William Gornall & Ilya A. Strebulaev, Squaring
Venture Capital Valuations with Reality, 135 J. FIN. ECON. 120 (2020)).
207. Aran, supra note 85.
208. On the role of disclosure in policy private company fraud, see Elizabeth Pollman, Private
Company Lies, 109 GEO. L.J. 353 (2020).
209. Ann M. Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder
Disclosure, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 499, 510 (2020).
210. Transcript at 27, Mathieson v. Digital Ocean, 2015 WL 4076395, (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015)
(No. 11185-VCP) (observing, in trying to assess the validity of a provision in a shareholder agreement
waiving inspection rights, “what's holding me up on that issue to some regard, No. 1 is we don't have
any case that quite deals with it squarely. We've had some that have recognized the principle, but then
for some reason or another have held that it wasn't clear and affirmative or they have not found a
waiver.”).
211. See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 42, at 188 (explaining how private ordering through
shareholder-adopted bylaws can “create laboratories of corporate governance that benefit the entire
corporate governance system”).
212. Romano & Sanga, supra note 44, at 32–33 (documenting diffusion of forum selection
bylaws).
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In contrast, the particularized governance provisions in shareholder
agreements vary substantially, creating interpretive uncertainty. As the cases
interpreting these provisions caution, their analysis must therefore be
context specific, meaning that other corporate participants cannot readily
rely on those decisions as to the validity of their own contracts. In addition
to the complexity associated with their validity, shareholder agreements
make it necessary to create, interpret, and integrate multiple documents to
ascertain the scope of various corporate participants’ rights and authority.
As the National Venture Capital Association website demonstrates, it is
common practice for a single corporation to use a number of different
shareholder agreements, each of which addresses different elements of the
shareholders’ relationship with his or her fellow shareholders and the
corporation.213 Separate agreements may address voting issues, rights
associated with share ownership including preemptive rights, redemption
rights and registration rights, and rights and responsibilities in connection
with a merger.
Drag-along rights, which are a common term in shareholder agreements,
illustrate this lack of predictability. Drag-along rights compel shareholders,
under specified conditions, to vote their stock in favor of a merger.
Technically, a drag-along provision is a form of voting agreement, and
voting agreements are explicitly authorized by most corporate statutes. But
corporate law is increasingly looking to shareholder votes in mergers as an
indication of transactional fairness and, in some cases, to reduce the level
of judicial scrutiny.214 In such cases, the approval of the transaction by
minority stockholders can have the effect of cleansing the merger process.
Such cases then raise the question whether shares voted pursuant to a dragalong have this same legal effect or, alternatively, in a corporation with a
drag-along provision, whether this cleansing procedure is legally
unavailable. Moreover, because the terms of drag-along provisions vary, it
is not clear that all such provisions should be treated the same way. A dragalong that requires a process for determining fair price or the approval of
disinterested directors, for example, might be evaluated differently from a
provision that is simply triggered by votes cast by a controlling stockholder
or group of stockholders.

213. NVCA, supra note 8.
214. See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312–13 (Del. 2015) (applying
business judgment rule to postclosing challenge to transaction approved by a majority of the
shareholders); Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 654 (Del. 2014) (applying business
judgment rule to controlling stockholder freeze-out merger that was approved by special committee and
fully informed uncoerced vote of minority stockholders).
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The lack of standardization reduces the predictability of stealth
governance provisions and increases their cost.215 As property law scholars
explain, standardization reduces transaction costs,216 facilitates the
conveyance of ownership interests,217 and can operate as a tool of constraint,
promoting ethical values and normative commitments.218 In corporate law,
predictability is particularly important, and commentators have observed
that it is more important for business participants that the law be predictable
than that it be correct.219
Lack of standardization also creates the potential for opportunism. VC
funds and controlling stockholders may view legal uncertainty as a basis for
overreaching, choosing to include aggressive provisions in shareholder
agreements despite the absence of any legal authority, in the hope or
expectation that the inclusion of these terms will deter counterparties from
asserting their rights.220 The potential for unequal bargaining power,
coupled with the general obstacles to shareholder rights litigation in private
companies, compounds this problem.221 These factors may explain the
215. The values of standardization differ for startups relative to traditional close corporations both
because of the number and type of investors and because the eventual goal of a startup is a market-based
exit transaction such as an initial public offering or a merger. See Pollman, supra note 1, at 164 (“Unlike
traditional closely held corporations, startups are aimed at eventually being acquired by another
corporation or transforming to a public corporation—their existence in startup form is understood to be
ephemeral like a caterpillar in its chrysalis.”).
216. Merrill & Smith, supra note 173, at 8.
217. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus
Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002).
218. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Codifying the Common Law of Property in India: Crystallization
and Standardization as Strategies of Constraint, 63 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 33, 76 (2015). See also Manuel
A. Utset, A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete Contracting: The Case of Shareholder
Contracts, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1329, 1405–06 (arguing that corporate formalities can serve as important
self-regulation mechanisms).
219. See, e.g., Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor Allen’s Jurisprudence and the Theory of Corporate
Law, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 683, 688 (1992) (footnote omitted) (describing “the necessity that corporate
law provide a sufficient level of stability and predictability to allow corporate planners to have a high
level of confidence as to the law that courts will apply to their transactions”); Roberta Romano, Law as
a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 227 (1985) (explaining
that efficient corporate law reduces the transaction costs of organizing and operating a business).
220. See James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L. REV.
257, 269 (2015) (noting that those in control of a corporation “enjoy important, and likely unerodable,
strategic advantages” in a system of private ordering). Aggressive efforts to limit shareholder rights
through shareholder agreements may be similar to the aggressive use of contractual waivers in other
instances of unequal bargaining power such as employer/employee and business/consumer. See, e.g.,
Heather Bromfield, Comment, The Denial of Relief: The Enforcement of Class Action Waivers in
Arbitration Agreements, 43 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 315, 333 (2009) (footnote omitted) (“Lack of
contractual mutuality runs rampant in situations of unequal bargaining power, such as consumer
contracts and employee agreements.”).
221. Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 1001 (2006) (describing the potential reputational costs of litigating against VCs,
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widespread use of certain provisions in shareholder agreements despite their
uncertain legal status.
Shareholder agreements also frustrate standardization in the treatment of
individual shareholders.222 Although corporate law does not mandate that
all shareholders be treated equally in all circumstances,223 that corporations
should generally provide equal treatment of shareholders with the same
economic interest is a foundational principle of corporate law.224 Unlike a
charter or bylaw provision, however, a shareholder agreement may cause
shareholders with the same economic interest to have different rights.225 For
example, not every shareholder is a signatory to every shareholder
agreement. If shareholder agreements are governed by contract law, only
signatories to that agreement are bound.
Nor do shareholder agreements need to provide all shareholders, even
shareholders holding the same class of stock, with equal rights. Substantial
shareholders and those with significant bargaining power typically contract
for rights that are not shared by other shareholders rights that may include
detailed inspection rights, the opportunity to observe board meetings or
participate in operational decisions, or rights with respect to the sale or
liquidity of their shares.226 By contrast, small shareholders may be forced to
give up significant rights in order to invest. Some of these shareholders may
lack the sophistication to understand the implications of the contracts that
they are forced to sign or be unaware of the terms of those contracts.
including future limits on the ability to obtain funding from VCs or work at a VC-funded firm). Cf.
Jeffrey M. Leavitt, Burned Angels: The Coming Wave of Minority Shareholder Oppression Claims in
Venture Capital Start-up Companies, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 223, 228 (2005) (predicting future wave of
litigation by “burned” angel investors, but observing that filed cases were limited and none survived pretrial settlement).
222. Shareholders may also differ in their ability to enforce a shareholder agreement, depending
on whether they are a party to it. See, e.g., Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 428, 443–
44 (Tex. Sup. 2017) (refusing to allow enforcement of forum selection provision in shareholders’
agreement by nonsignatories).
223. See, e.g., Roger J. Dennis, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and Greenmail: Is New Legislation
Needed?, 19 GA. L. REV. 281, 307 (1985) (observing that “[t]here is no requirement of equal treatment
in negotiated share repurchases”).
224. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and
Reorganizations, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1072, 1074 (1983) (terming the proposition of equal treatment of
shareholders as “part of the received learning about publicly held corporations”); see also Dual-Class
Stock, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS., https://www.cii.org/dualclass_stock [https://perma.cc/277GWZ6W] (“CII’s policies endorse the principle of ‘one share, one vote’: every share of a public
company’s common stock should have equal voting rights.”).
225. See, e.g., Henry v. Phixios Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 12504, 2017 WL 2928034 (Del. Ch. July
10, 2017) (finding that shareholder was not bound by a shareholder agreement when he acquired stock
without knowledge of transfer restrictions contained in that agreement).
226. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 220, at 269 (observing that the board, officers and controlling
stockholders “enjoy important, and likely unerodable, strategic advantages” in a system of private
ordering).
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Employees who receive stock or options as a substantial component of their
compensation are likely to be particularly vulnerable.
Moreover, even those shareholders who sign a shareholder agreement
may not all be bound. Startups involve a range of investors. There are
substantial differences in the knowledge, sophistication, and bargaining
power of a venture capital fund, a sovereign wealth fund, and a former
employee—yet all may be shareholders. If the validity of a shareholder’s
consent to a waiver of his or her rights requires that the consent be knowing,
voluntary, and uncoerced, a court’s analysis of consent may depend on
individual circumstances. For example, a shareholder agreement between a
VC fund and the entrepreneur that purports to waive certain shareholder
rights might be enforced while the same provision in an employment
agreement or option agreement over which a prospective shareholder has
limited bargaining power may not. At oral argument of a motion to dismiss
in Matheson v. Digital Ocean,227 VC Parsons expressed some concern about
the validity of such a contractual waiver of shareholder rights in an
employee stock option agreement. Describing the agreement as potentially
a contract of adhesion, VC Parsons questioned whether the employee’s
assent to the terms of that agreement constituted a knowing and voluntary
waiver of his statutory rights.228 Similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court in
Manti expressly conditioned its holding that the shareholder agreement was
enforceable on the fact that the petitioners were “sophisticated and informed
investors.”229
Finally, shareholder agreements may limit shareholders’ ability to
exercise oversight. The governance rights that startups seek to eliminate
through shareholder agreements—inspection rights, appraisal rights, and
the right to bring fiduciary duty litigation—are specifically designed to
enhance the ability of minority shareholders to oversee corporate
operations. As noted above, exemptions from federal disclosure
requirements insulate startups from both investor and regulatory oversight.
Whether the extent of that insulation is efficient or not, shareholder rights
partially fill the gap by affording shareholders both some level of access to
corporate information and the potential to hold managers, directors, and
controlling shareholders accountable.
227. Matheson v. Digital Ocean, Inc., C.A. No. 11185-VCP (Aug. 27, 2015) (on file with author).
228. See id., Transcript at 29 (“I don't know where on that spectrum it is, and it seems conceivable
to me that it might make a difference in the enforceability of this waiver.”).
229. See Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., C.A. No. 354, 2020, 2021 Del.
LEXIS 286, at *46 (Sept. 13, 2021) (noting that “if Authentix attempted to enforce the Refrain
Obligation against a retail investor that was not involved in negotiating the Stockholders Agreement—
or against outsiders that lack material knowledge of Authentix's corporate governance dynamics—
concerns about information asymmetry might justify excusing enforcement”).
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Moreover, these waivers are most likely to limit the rights of small
investors—current and former employees and those to whom they transfer
their shares—investors who otherwise lack the ability to exercise any kind
of oversight. Daniel Grove, the plaintiff in Juul Inc. v. Grove, for example,
was a former employee who received his stock pursuant to an employee
stock option plan.230 Grove sought to exercise his inspection rights in order
to obtain information in connection with his pursuit of litigation against
Juul’s directors alleging various breaches of fiduciary duty.231 Given the
importance of statutory inspection rights in enabling a plaintiff to overcome
the procedural barriers to such litigation, a valid inspection rights waiver
would substantially undermine Grove’s ability to exercise such oversight.232
IV. IMPLICATIONS
In addition to these problems discussed in Part III, stealth governance
creates an illogical disparity between the corporate law that applies to
startups and that which applies to publicly traded corporations. Public
corporations cannot readily use shareholder agreements for private
ordering.233 Unlike startups then, they cannot evade statutory limits on the
permissible scope of private ordering available through the charter and
bylaws. Similarly, they cannot modify the voting rights and control
dynamics associated with their share class structure or afford differential
rights to similarly situated shareholders.
There is a public value in having a single version of corporate law apply
to all corporations—public and private. The need for managerial
accountability, the mechanisms for addressing shareholder collective action
problems, concerns about conflicts of interest, and the challenges of
ensuring that shareholders enter and exit the business on fair terms, are not
categorically different depending on whether a corporation’s securities are
230. Hailey Konnath, Juul Says Investor Waived His Right to Inspect Its Books, LAW360, Jan. 9,
2020.
231. Complaint at 27, Grove v. Bowen, No. CGC-20-582059 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 7, 2020),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/X2DHAOPV58K9EU98UFDA50UR7DJ/do
wnload?fmt=pdf.
232. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Moreno & Kristin P. Housh, Delaware Supreme Court Provides
Important Guidance Regarding Section 220 Demands, Rejecting Several Limiting Principles Frequently
Offered by Corporations Resisting Stockholder Inspection Demands, NAT’L L. REV.: SHEPPARDMULLIN
CORP. & SEC. LAW BLOG (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/printpdf/143110
[https://perma.cc/9T9B-8GFB] (“By stressing the importance of stockholder inspection rights in
instances of alleged corporate wrongdoing, the Delaware courts are channeling putative stockholder
plaintiffs through this process before those plaintiffs initiate a potentially meritless derivative suit to the
detriment of the corporation in whose benefit the derivative action is allegedly brought.”).
233. Public trading, by its nature, makes it impossible for all shareholders to be signatories to a
shareholder agreement and therefore bound by its terms.
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traded in the public capital markets. The value of a single body of corporate
law is increased by the freedom that business entities possess to choose a
more contract-based alternative legal structure such as a statutory close
corporation or LLC. To the extent that an entity has chosen corporate law,
its choice should reflect a willingness to be bound by the rules of the
corporate form, including its mandatory features.
If anything, the poor quality of startup governance suggests that private
companies should be given less flexibility than public corporations to depart
from the structure and formalities of general corporate law. Shielding
venture capital funds and idiosyncratic founders, who are already shielded
from capital market discipline, from internal monitoring by other investors
contributes to their ability to prolong their adolescent behavior until they
decide to enter the public capital markets.234
The way to maintain a single version of corporate law is to require that
all corporations, public and private, play by the same rules. Private ordering
should take place through a corporation’s constitutive documents, the
charter and bylaws, and those documents should be subject in scope to the
statutory and common law on the permissible scope of private ordering.235
This approach would reinforce the corporation’s status as an independent
legal entity that operates not by means of multilateral contracts but
according to a set of legal principles that include both substantive rules and
the procedures by which those rules are tailored or modified.
This is not to suggest that all shareholder agreements in the startup
context or otherwise should be invalid. The VC-funded startup is largely a
creature of contract, and shareholder agreements play a valuable rule in
tailoring cash flow and control rights and facilitating a flexible financing
structure. Where this Article weighs in is with respect to shareholder
agreements that go further and address governance issues—those rights or
powers that are typically addressed in corporate charters or bylaws or where

234. See Jones, supra note 15, at 167–68 (footnote omitted) (“[I]n the absence of an impending
IPO, Unicorn managers and investors lack sufficient incentives to develop governance structures and
practices appropriate for enterprises of their scale.”); David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Governance
Gone Wild: Epic Misbehavior at Uber Technologies (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ.,
Closer Look Series: Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corp. Governance, No. CGRP-70; Stanford
Univ.
Graduate
Sch.
of
Bus.
Rsch.,
Research
Paper
No.
18-3,
2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3087371
[https://perma.cc/3S5L-BTMG]
(describing governance failures at Uber prior to its IPO).
235. While this Article was in the editorial process, Justice Valihura articulated a similar analysis
in her dissent in Manti. Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., C.A. No. 354, 2020, 2021
Del. LEXIS 286, at *79 (Sept. 13, 2021) (Valihura, J., dissenting) (arguing that private ordering
provisions that alter the “delicate balance of power . . . among a Delaware corporation’s constituencies”
belong “in the charter or bylaws”).
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the shareholder agreement expressly deviates from the governance structure
set forth in the corporation’s constitutive documents.
Existing statutes provide ample guidance on the distinction. Statutes
provide default rules with respect to matters such as the selection and
removal of directors, the allocation of shareholder and director voting rights,
and the scope of inspection and appraisal rights. Statutes also provide
explicit guidance for modifying both default rules and common law rights
and liabilities, including the permissible instruments for doing so and the
limits, if any, on the scope of such modifications. Using shareholder
agreements instead of these instruments, particularly to evade such statutory
limits, should not be allowed. In contrast, the charter and bylaws typically
do not address how and when investors pay for stock, commitments to
provide additional capital, or individual rights against the corporate entity
such as the right to compel registration.
The scope of this proposal is limited to startups, and this Article does not
propose to apply this standard to traditional close corporations. As the
legislative provisions concerning such entities reflect, close corporations
operate quite differently from other corporations. Indeed, the premise
behind close corporation statutes is both to recognize that difference and to
afford close corporations the option of being governed by a different set of
rules than those applicable to other corporations.236
The Article’s proposed limitation on stealth governance should not be
understood as a condemnation of innovative corporate governance by
startups. Corporations have identified new solutions to market and legal
developments and tailored those solutions to their individual needs through
private ordering. Situating private ordering within the corporation’s
constitutive documents rather than in shareholder agreements, however,
provides three advantages over stealth governance.
First, the proposal restores the legislative and judicial roles in
determining the permissible scope of private ordering. The debate over the
extent to which corporate law should incorporate mandatory features as
opposed to being subject to complete freedom of contract is beyond the
scope of this Article. Assuming, however, that some constraints on private
ordering are desirable as a matter of efficiency or public policy, courts and
236. The question of whether a close corporation should be compelled to register under state close
corporation statutes in order to use shareholder agreements more expansively is beyond the scope of this
Article. Only a small percentage of the corporations that are eligible for statutory close corporation status
choose to register under these statutes. See, e.g., Tara J. Wortman, Note, Unlocking Lock-in: Limited
Liability Companies and the Key to Underutilization of Close Corporation Statutes, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1362, 1362 (1995) (estimating that only five percent of eligible firms elect statutory close corporation
status); id. at 1365 (examining “the possible reasons for the systematic underutilization of close
corporation statutes by firms eligible for that status”).
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legislatures, not individual corporations, should determine the scope of
those constraints.
Second, the proposal allows lawmakers to determine the appropriate
mechanism by which private ordering is to be implemented. In particular,
the proposal recognizes the substantial differences between the charter and
the bylaws as governance instruments. As noted above, the greater visibility
of charter provisions—particularly in private corporations—enhances the
transparency of private ordering, enabling investors, scholars, regulators,
and those who deal with the corporation to understand and evaluate its
governance structure. This visibility creates network externalities and
fosters standardization. In addition, as I have argued elsewhere, charter
provisions require bilateral action by the board and the shareholders, and
this requirement offers greater protection against potential self-dealing.237
Finally, by requiring private ordering to take place through charter and
bylaw provisions, which can be implemented by public corporations as well
as startups, this Article’s proposal would allow all corporations to benefit
from innovation.238 The extension of new governance provisions to public
companies allows their effects to be broadly evaluated. Commentators can
analyze the policy implications of a bylaw that purports to limit the scope
of managerial fiduciary duties.239 The capital markets can price the impact
of a forum selection bylaw. These benefits lower transaction costs and
increase the likely efficiency of firm specific private ordering.
Significantly, when they engage in private ordering, corporate
participants need not limit themselves to the status quo. This Article’s
proposal enables private ordering innovation through a tripartite process. In
the first instance, corporate participants identify a potentially beneficial
issue that can potentially be addressed through firm specific private
ordering. To the extent they believe that the innovation is permitted under
existing law, they can implement it through a charter or bylaw provision. To
the extent that they believe existing law does not currently permit the
provision, they can seek legislation. If a corporation implements a new type
of charter or bylaw provision and that provision is subsequently challenged,
courts can evaluate the degree to which it is in tension with the statute and
public policy. Judicial approval of the provision is likely to lead to broader
237. Fisch, supra note 20.
238. As noted above, corporate charter and bylaw provisions “are available for the public to
inspect while the shareholder agreement is typically private, shared only by the parties involved.”
Articles of Incorporation and Shareholder Agreements: What’s the Difference?, LEGAL NATURE,
https://www.legalnature.com/guides/articles-of-incorporation-and-shareholder-agreements-whats-thedifference [https://perma.cc/HR5W-MUDV].
239. See Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 47.
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adoption, but even then, the provision will be subject to the discipline of
market forces, and some innovative provisions will not be successful.240
Finally, state legislatures can evaluate the courts’ analysis and ratify or
overturn the courts’ conclusions by statute.
Formal legislative action operates as a safety valve with respect to this
process. State legislatures can evaluate the policy rationale for taking a
mandatory versus enabling approach. From a comparative institutional
perspective, they are particularly well-suited to engage in this analysis.241
Legislatures can readily access the information necessary to determine the
potential costs and benefits of innovation.242 Unlike courts, legislatures
control their agendas and need not wait for litigation to evaluate the validity
of a provision. Finally, legislatures can assess the interests of those likely to
be affected by an opt-out or waiver, interests that may not be represented in
the litigation context. As a result, they can identify the private ordering
approach most protective of those interests. For example, the legislature
might determine that corporations should be allowed to limit director
liability for breaches of the duty of care through private ordering, but that
the risk that directors will act out of self-interest if permitted to adopt such
limitations unilaterally means that they should be limited to charter
provisions that require shareholder approval.243
Corporate law contains numerous examples of this process in action.
Corporations adopted innovative charter and bylaw forum selection
provisions in response to the explosion in multi-forum litigation challenging
mergers. The validity of these provisions was uncertain until the Delaware
court’s Boilermakers decision, after which their adoption increased
dramatically.244 The Delaware legislature subsequently endorsed forum
240. See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, How
Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 695 (2016)
(detailing the power of both Institutional Shareholder Services and the Wachtell Lipton law firm in
influencing firm behavior with respect to the adoption of an innovative corporate governance bylaw).
241. See generally Neil K. Komesar, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (developing analysis of comparative institutional
advantage).
242. Roberta Romano explains, for example, the variety of legislative responses in the late 1980s
to the crisis in the market for D&O insurance as “an excellent case study of the successful operation of
federalism as a laboratory for legal reform.” Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal
Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 221 (2006). See
also Edward P. Welch & Robert S. Saunders, Freedom and Its Limits in the Delaware Corporation Law,
33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 845, 854 (2008) (describing Delaware legislature’s adoption of section 102(b)(7) in
response to the D&O insurance crisis).
243. This analysis likely explains the structure of DGCL section 102(b)(7), which permits director
exculpation provisions but requires that they be in the corporate charter. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
102(b)(7) (2021).
244. See Romano & Sanga, supra note 44 (documenting the spread of forum selection provisions
after the Boilermakers decision).
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selection provisions and provided clarification as to their permissible
scope.245
The corporate opportunity doctrine is a component of the common law
duty of loyalty.246 Courts adopted various tests to determine when the
doctrine had been breached, and the variety and complexity of the tests led
the doctrine to become “unpredictable and over complicated.”247 To reduce
possible corporate opportunity doctrine litigation, Tri-Star Pictures
amended its charter to limit the liability of its directors for potential
breaches. The court in Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. held that, because
the charter provision was potentially invalid in that it conflicted with the
duty of loyalty, a mandatory corporate law rule.248 The Delaware legislature
responded by adopting DGCL section 122(17), which authorizes
corporations to adopt corporate opportunity doctrine waivers in their
charters.249 The legislation responded to a broad-based market demand and,
subsequent to its enactment, corporations broadly adopted such waivers.250
Many states followed Delaware’s lead and adopted similar legislation.251
Moreover, at least one empirical study has found market reactions to the
adoption of such waivers to be favorable.252
Finally, as institutional investors became more active in corporate
governance, they sought ways to overcome collective action problems and
increase shareholder access to the corporate proxy machinery. One of the
tools for doing so was proxy reimbursement bylaws—bylaws that entitled
245. See Fisch, supra note 6, at 1669–71 (describing legislation authorizing forum selection
charter and bylaw provisions).
246. Eric Talley & Mira Hashmall, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine (Feb. 2001) (unpublished
manuscript),
https://weblaw.usc.edu/why/academics/cle/icc/assets/docs/
articles/iccfinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/983C-FUAY].
247. Martha M. Effinger, Comment, A New Corporate Statute: Adding Explicit Procedures to
Maryland’s Corporate Opportunity Waiver Provision, 48 U. BALT. L. REV. 293, 300 (2019).
248. Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., C.A. No. 9477, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 56, at *26 (May 5,
1989) (“Thus, at least one scenario (and perhaps others) could plausibly be constructed where Article
Sixth would eliminate or limit the liability of Tri-Star directors for breach of their fiduciary duty of
loyalty—a result proscribed by § 102(b)(7).”).
249. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17). The statute also authorizes such waivers “by action of [the]
board of directors.” Id.
250. See Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 47, at 1079 (stating that “hundreds of public
corporations in our sample—and well over one thousand in the population—have disclosed or executed
waivers”).
251. See Effinger, supra note 247, at 305 (“[M]any states have followed by adopting corporate
opportunity waivers.”). Notably, not every state’s approach is identical to Delaware’s. For example,
Georgia allows corporate opportunity doctrine waivers in both the charter and the bylaws. See GA. CODE
ANN. § 14-2-870 (2021).
252. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 47, at 1081 (reporting results of an event study finding that
“market reactions [to the adoption of a waiver] appear to be favorable, resulting in an average positive
abnormal stock return hovering around one percent in the days immediately surrounding the
announcement date”).

2021]

STEALTH GOVERNANCE

959

shareholders to reimbursement of their expenses in conducting a proxy
contest if the context was successful. In CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees
Pension Plan, the Delaware Supreme Court struck down a proxy
reimbursement bylaw on the basis that it interfered with the board’s
statutory authority to determine how corporate money should be spent.253
The legislature overturned the decision, adopting a statutory provision that
explicitly authorized proxy reimbursement bylaws.254
These examples suggest that requiring corporations to use their charters
and bylaws to implement private ordering will not stifle innovation. To the
contrary, the use of formal governance tools facilitates the transparency of
governance innovation, leads to clarification of the law, and permits the
spread of provisions that have the potential to enhance corporate value.
Channeling innovation through charter and bylaw provisions, provisions
that can be adopted by public companies and whose validity can be clarified
through litigation and legislation, has led to their widespread use. At the
same time, waivers and innovations that have been implemented through
shareholder agreements—such as appraisal waivers and limits on
shareholder inspection rights—have not been standardized and remain of
uncertain validity.
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the role of stealth governance—the use by
startups of shareholder agreements as substitutes for the corporate charter
and bylaws in adopting firm-specific private ordering. It has argued that the
expansive use of shareholder agreements is premised on confusion between
the contract law and corporate law paradigms and that allowing corporate
participants to evade existing limitations on the scope and structure of
private ordering sacrifices important corporate law values.
As the number and size of private companies continue to grow, stealth
governance raises increasing concerns. Because private companies are not
subject to federally mandated disclosure requirements or capital market
discipline, they are particularly vulnerable to poor corporate governance
practices that reduce the accountability of officers, directors and controlling
shareholders and potentially sacrifice the interests of minority shareholders
and other stakeholders. The opacity and uncertainty associated with
shareholder agreements increase this potential. Stealth governance also
253. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 239–40 (Del. 2008).
254. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113 (2021). See Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress
Should Stay Out of Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 763 (2013) (describing legislation
authorizing both proxy reimbursement and proxy access bylaws).
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frustrates innovation by limiting the standardization and dispersion of new
governance terms, impeding the market’s ability to evaluate them, and
frustrating the growth of judicial precedent.
This Article therefore argues against applying principles of freedom of
contract to uphold and enforce stealth governance. Instead, it proposes that
private ordering should be limited to a corporation’s traditional constitutive
instruments—the charter and bylaws. It highlights the superiority of these
instruments in providing both predictability and a mechanism for continued
evolution of governance norms.

